This case might have put MERS in the SPOT LIGHT: MATTER OF MERSCORP, INC. v. Romaine, 295 AD 2d 431 – NY: Supreme Court, Appellate Div., 2nd Dept. 2002

295 A.D.2d 431 (2002)

743 N.Y.S.2d 562

In the Matter of MERSCORP, INC., et al., Appellants,
v.
EDWARD P. ROMAINE et al., Respondents.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department.

Decided June 10, 2002.

S. Miller, J.P., Krausman and Cozier, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the order is reversed, without costs or disbursements, and the motion for a preliminary injunction is granted pending the Supreme Court’s determination of the hybrid proceeding and action on the merits.

The petitioners, Merscorp, Inc. (hereinafter Merscorp), and its subsidiary, MortgageElectronic Registration Systems, Inc. (hereinafter MERS), operate a national electronicregistration system (hereinafter the MERS System) for residential mortgages and related instruments (hereinafter MERS Instruments). In essence, lenders who subscribe to the MERS System (hereinafter MERS Members) designate MERS as their nominee or the “mortgagee of record” for the purpose of 432*432 recording MERS Instruments in the county where the subject real property is located. The MERS Instruments are registered in a central database, which tracks all future transfers of the beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights among MERS Members. As of May 2001, the MERS System had recorded more than four million MERS Instruments in more than 3,000 counties in all 50 states, including more than 16,000 MERS Instruments in Suffolk County.

On April 5, 2001, the Attorney General issued Informal Opinion No. 2001-2 (2001 Atty Gen [Inf Ops] 2001-2) in response to two questions posed by the Nassau County Clerk regarding the latter’s obligation to record and index MERS Instruments. Although the Attorney General concluded that the Nassau County Clerk had a statutory duty under Real Property Law § 291 to record MERS Instruments if they were duly acknowledged and accompanied by the proper fee, he advised the Nassau County Clerk to list the MERS Instruments in the County’s alphabetical indexes under the names of the actual lenders. Based in part on the Attorney General’s Informal Opinion, the Suffolk County Clerk announced that as of May 1, 2001, he would no longer accept MERS Instruments which listed MERS as the mortgagee or nominee of record unless MERS was, in fact, the actual mortgagee.

Simultaneously with commencing this hybrid proceeding and action, Merscorp and MERS moved, inter alia, for a preliminary injunction to compel the Suffolk County Clerk to record MERS Instruments and list MERS as the mortgagee in the County’s alphabetical mortgagee-mortgagor indexes for recorded conveyances. Although the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Bivona, J.), granted the request of Merscorp and MERS for a temporary restraining order on May 2, 2001, the same court (Catterson, J.), subsequently denied their request for a preliminary injunction on May 22, 2001.

It is well established that the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750). In exercising that discretion, however, the Supreme Court must consider several factors, including whether the moving party has established (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied, and (3) a balance of the equities in favor of the injunction (see CPLR 6301, 6312 [a]; Grant Co. v Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 517; Clarion Assoc. v Colby Co., 276 AD2d 461). Upon our review of the record, we find that the Supreme Court failed to set forth specific findings with respect to the tripartite test for injunctive relief and 433*433 improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

Merscorp and MERS demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its claim for a writ of mandamus to compel the Suffolk County Clerk to record MERS Instruments (see Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525, 539). Contrary to the contention of the Suffolk County Clerk, he has a statutory duty that is ministerial in nature to record a written conveyance if it is duly acknowledged and accompanied by the proper fee (see Real Property Law § 290 [3]; § 291; County Law § 525 [1]). Accordingly, the Clerk does not have the authority to refuse to record a conveyance which satisfies the narrowly drawn prerequisites set forth in the recording statute (see People ex rel. Frost v Woodbury, 213 NY 51; People ex rel. Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Grifenhagen, 209 NY 569; Matter of Westminster Hgts. Co. v Delany, 107 App Div 577, affd 185 NY 539; Putnam v Stewart, 97 NY 411).

This Court notes that the Suffolk County index is governed exclusively by Real Property Law § 316-a. Real Property Law § 316-a (1) provides that the Suffolk County Clerk shall record and index “[e]very instrument affecting real estate or chattels real, situated in the county of Suffolk * * * which shall have been recorded in the office of the [C]lerk of said county * * * pursuant to the provisions of this act” (emphasis supplied). Pursuant to Real Property Law § 316-a (2), the Suffolk County Clerk must maintain the indexes so they “contain the date of recording of each instrument, the names of the parties to each instrument and the liber and page of the record thereof and shall be substantially the forms of the schedules hereto annexed” (emphasis supplied; see also Real Property Law § 316-a [5]).

Therefore, in light of Real Property Law § 316-a, Merscorp and MERS also demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits of their claim to compel the Suffolk County Clerk to perform his ministerial duty to index MERS Instruments as the language of Real Property Law § 316-a is mandatory and not permissive (see Klostermann v Cuomo, supra at 539).

Moreover, to the extent that the Suffolk County Clerk has recorded approximately 16,000 MERS Instruments before May 1, 2001, MERS established irreparable harm to its business operation, the mortgage lending industry, and the general public, in the absence of a preliminary injunction compelling the Suffolk County Clerk to record and index MERS Instruments (see Clarion Assoc. v Colby Co., supra; McLaughlin, Piven, 434*434 Vogel v Nolan & Co., 114 AD2d 165, 174), particularly since Real Property Law § 316-a (8), (9) and (10) sets forth a mechanism for correcting any mistakes in the indexes.

Under these circumstances, a preliminary injunction should be granted to maintain the status quo while the legal issues are determined in a deliberate and judicious manner (see Moody v Filipowski, 146 AD2d 675, 678; Incorporated Vil. of Babylon v Anthony’s Water Cafe, 137 AD2d 791, 792; Tucker v Toia, 54 AD2d 322, 326).

Goldstein, J., concurs in the result, with the following memorandum:

Although I do not necessarily agree with my colleagues that there is a likelihood of success on the merits, I nevertheless concur in granting a preliminary injunction, as the Supreme Court failed to take into consideration and address the other factors which must be taken into account, namely, irreparable harm to the movant absent the granting of a preliminary injunction, and a balancing of the equities (see Melvin v Union Coll., 195 AD2d 447, 448). Where, as here, the case involves issues of first impression in the courts, it is appropriate to grant a preliminary injunction, “`to hold the parties in status quo while the legal issues are determined in a deliberate and judicious manner'” (Time Sq. Books v City of Rochester, 223 AD2d 270, 278,quoting Tucker v Toia, 54 AD2d 322, 326; State of New York v City of New York, 275 AD2d 740; Sau Thi Ma v Xuan T. Lien, 198 AD2d 186).

RELATED ARTICLE:

The Conclusion…If we could only turn back time: IN THE MATTER OF MERSCORP, INC. v. Romaine, 2005 NY Slip Op 9728 – NY: Supreme Court, Appellate Div., 2nd Dept. 2005

SmarTrend’s Trend Spotter Sees Continued Downward Momentum on Shares of Lender Processing Services (LPS)

May 27, 2010 (SmarTrend(R) Spotlight via COMTEX) —-SmarTrend identified a Downtrend for Lender Processing Services (NYSE:LPS) on May 07, 2010 at $35.31. In approximately 3 weeks, Lender Processing Services has returned 5.8% as of today’s recent price of $33.27.

Lender Processing Services is currently below its 50-day moving average of $37.60 and below its 200-day moving average of $38.92. Look for these moving averages to decline to confirm the company’s downward momentum.

SmarTrend will continue to scan these moving averages and a number of other proprietary indicators for any changes in momentum for shares of Lender Processing Services.

Write to Chip Brian at cbrian@tradethetrend.com

Shares of DJSP Enterprises Get SLAMMED….FALL 25%. Are we seeing a DownTrend?

Huge profits result from foreclosure procedure

By RICHARD WILNER NYPost
Last Updated: 1:03 AM, May 30, 2010
Posted: 1:03 AM, May 30, 2010

A new gold rush is sweeping the country — only this time the speculators are looking to get fat off the $4 billion home foreclosure industry by promising banks a streamlined and low-cost method to kick folks out of their homes. DinSFLA: Last time I heard the word “speculators” was in the CONDO BOOM!

In the last two years, as the mortgage meltdown intensified, four companies have gone public or filed papers to go public — each looking to get their hands on cash to help grow into a national powerhouse quickly to take advantage of the soft housing market.

Buying shares of these companies is like shorting the housing market — sort of giving the average investor a chance to be a mini-John Paulson, the hedge fund mogul who made billions betting against the housing market in 2007. There were roughly 2.9 million foreclosures in 2009 and there are currently 6 million homeowners 60 days or more delinquent on their mortgage.

The companies — DJSP Enterprises, which saw revenues grow 31 percent last year, Altisource Portfolio Solutions, which reported a 182 percent jump in profits last year, and Lender Processing Services, whose $2.4 billion in revenue was up 29 percent last year — each offer a technology platform that links mortgage lender clients on one end and law firms clients on the other.

A fourth company, Prommis Solutions, which swung to a $7.9 million profit in 2009 from a loss in 2008, recently filed papers to go public.

The four companies profit, in large part, from the high volume of mortgage defaults — collecting fees from banks for each referral and from law firms, which file the foreclosure actions. In fact, the companies warn that a turnaround in the housing market or additional mortgage-modification plans from Washington could chill their profits.

Last week, shares of DJSP Enterprises got slammed, falling 25 percent on Friday, to $6.46, a 52-week low, after the company lowered its guidance for 2010 in the wake of a drop in the number of foreclosures.

It’s a strange, new sector of the housing finance sector, where bad news for America fattens the bottom lines for these companies, and good news for beleaguered homeowners knocks the stuffing — and dollars — from their bottom lines.

“Cat Out Of the Bag” (Trade Secrets) in CAPITAL ONE, NA v. Forbes, Fla: Dist. Court of Appeal, 2nd Dist. 2010

CAPITAL ONE, N.A., as successor by merger to Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., Petitioner,
v.
DOUGLAS R. FORBES, Respondent.

Case No. 2D09-4735.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 12, 2010.

Carrie Ann Wozniak of Akerman Senterfitt, Orlando, for Petitioner.

Nicole E. Durkin of Deeb & Durkin, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Respondent.

LaROSE, Judge.

Capital One, N.A. (the Bank), seeks a writ of certiorari to quash a protective order that allows the disclosure of trade secrets to Mr. Forbes’s consultants and experts. The Bank also asks us to quash the trial court’s order because it did not sufficiently limit the scope of discovery.

Factual Background

The Bank filed a mortgage foreclosure action against Mr. Forbes. Allegedly, Mr. Forbes breached a construction loan agreement. Mr. Forbes filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, anticipatory breach of contract, and fraud in the inducement.

Mr. Forbes requested documents from the Bank. It produced responsive documents except, as relevant here, for requests ten and thirteen:

10. All technical and administrative manuals used in the internal communications system of Lender, or through which Lender policies, practices and procedures were communicated to its bank officers, employees, agents, partners, managers and/or “staff,” effective during the period from January 1, 2006 through the present, including, but not limited to, those manuals relating to construction or developer financing.

. . . .

13. All complaints, claims or protests brought in any judicial forum, arbitration proceeding, or industry dispute resolution forum by Lender clients or third parties against Lender alleging any breach of obligations, terms, conditions, or responsibilities by Lender in the conduct or exercise of its responsibilities and obligations with respect to or arising from engaging in the business of banking within the preceding five (5) years.

The Bank sought a protective order. The Bank argued that its construction-lending manual is a trade secret requiring adequate measures to protect against improper dissemination. There appears to be no dispute that the manual is a trade secret. The Bank also argued that other complaints, claims, or protests made against the Bank in any forum in the past five years were irrelevant, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence, and intended solely to harass the Bank. See generally, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boecher, 733 So. 2d 993, 995 (Fla. 1999) (holding that there is an exception to the rule of complete discovery where it may be harassing or embarrassing).

After a hearing, the trial court denied the Bank’s motion as to request 13, except it narrowed the time frame to three years. The trial court concluded that the requested documents “may potentially lead to admissible evidence just based upon the counter plaintiff’s theory of policy written or potentially otherwise as to the lender’s motive to pull out of the project.”

As for the manual, the Bank’s counsel brought the document to the hearing for an in-camera inspection. The trial court did not inspect the materials but accepted counsel’s explanation that the materials contained the Bank’s lending guidelines and practices. The Bank’s counsel argued that the Bank would produce the materials if the trial court entered an adequate confidentiality order. The trial court denied the motion for a protective order, but agreed to grant a “confidentiality agreement between the parties for the protection of [the Bank].”

The trial court asked Mr. Forbes’s counsel to take the Bank’s proposed confidentiality order from the hearing and draft an order satisfactory to both sides. The Bank and Mr. Forbes could not agree. Each submitted a proposed order to the trial court. To center the dispute, we note that Mr. Forbes’s proposed order had no provision requiring consultants, experts, or their employees retained for the litigation to consent to the confidentiality provisions before viewing the manual.

The trial court adopted Mr. Forbes’s proposed order. The order provided that documents marked “Confidential” shall not be disclosed to any persons, except for counsel actively engaged in the litigation along with their employees and staff, parties and employees of the parties, persons with prior knowledge of the documents or the confidential information contained therein, and court officials involved in the litigation. Other relevant portions of the order provide as follows:

3. Plaintiff shall produce the documents requested, however the time period shall be limited to three (3) years prior to the date of this Order.

4. That the documents being produced pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Defendant’s First Request for Production of Documents which are marked “Confidential” by Plaintiff’s counsel shall not be disclosed to any persons, except that such documents may be disclosed or otherwise utilized as follows:

. . . .

(B) Such documents may also be disclosed to persons noticed for depositions during the course of such depositions, including retained outside consultants or experts and their employees retained for the purpose of assisting counsel in the litigation;

. . . .

5. Within 30 days after final conclusion of all aspects of this litigation, stamped confidential documents and all copies of same . . . shall be returned to the party or person which produced such documents or, at the option of the producer, destroyed.

(Emphasis added.)

Certiorari Jurisdiction

We may grant a petition for certiorari “only when the petitioner establishes (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. We examine prongs two and three first to determine our certiorari jurisdiction.” DeLoach v. Aird, 989 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)(citing Parkway Bank v. Ft. Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). If jurisdictional prongs two and three are not fulfilled, then we dismiss the petition rather than deny it. Id.

Analysis

Other Claims Specified in Request 13

The trial court denied, in part, and granted, in part, the Bank’s motion for a protective order as to these materials. The trial court narrowed Mr. Forbes’s request from five years to three years but did not otherwise narrow its breadth.

Discovery allows the parties to find potentially relevant evidence. The conduct of discovery is left to the trial court’s sound discretion. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1); Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189, 193 (Fla. 2003). The order on review does not necessarily cause irreparable harm by allowing discovery of what the Bank claims to be irrelevant materials. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Vreeland, 973 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citingFirst Paradee, Ltd. v. Jones, 828 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). Thus, certiorari jurisdiction is improper. We dismiss this portion of the Bank’s petition.

Manuals Specified in Request 10

The Bank argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by requiring the disclosure of trade secrets without providing adequate protective measures. An order requiring disclosure of trade secrets may cause irreparable injury that cannot be corrected on appeal; the disclosure lets the “cat out of the bag.” Id. Here, the trial court did not err. Its order sufficiently protects the Bank. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995). The Bank is concerned that experts or consultants retained by Mr. Forbes will misuse the materials. The order does not ignore that concern; only specified individuals may have access to the materials for the stated and limited purposes of assisting counsel in the litigation. No other use is contemplated. Further, the order requires that designated confidential materials, and any copies, be returned or destroyed at the end of the litigation.

Perhaps the order could have been clearer. However, we understand it to limit experts’ and consultants’ access to confidential information. Paragraph 4 of the order provides a blanket protection that documents may not be disclosed to “any person,” with enumerated exceptions. Importantly, the identification of people to whom access is granted is drawn narrowly to include only the parties and their employees, court employees, and outside consultants and experts. As for the consultants and experts, the order allows access only for a limited time and for the limited purposes of assisting counsel in this litigation.^[1] The trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law by entering the order proposed by Mr. Forbes’s counsel. As to this issue, the petition for certiorari is denied.

Dismissed in part; denied in part.

SILBERMAN and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

[1] We do not decide who would be liable should a consultant or expert violate the protective order. See, e.g.,Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 973 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding a nonparty liable for civil contempt where the nonparty had knowledge of the protective order.)

ARE FORECLOSURE MILLS Coercing Buyers for BANK OWNED homes? ARE ALL THE MILLS?

YOU MUST use Sellers Title Company! If you do by 6/30 I will give you an extra 3.5% towards your CC!

Found this in Trulia but it may get deleted once this is posted. It’s ok …thanks to Baby Jesus I saved it! But it goes exactly like this:

fannie mae owned.bank property. property is vacant.all offers requiring financing must have preapproval letter.all cash offer require proof of fund(see attachement).this property is eligible for home path renovation mortgage-as little as 3% down.buyer must close with seller closing agent(david j. stern law offices,p.a).investors not eligible for first 15days.*for showing instr please read broker remarks* note:offers must be submitted using attachment.close by 30 june and receive extra 3.5% in closing cost

Looking further into this I noticed the following:

• Still in the name of the owner
• NOT named under any REO
• Home last sold for 245K
• Now listed at 120K

Here is the BIGGEST:

I found a Bank-owned packet for this “SPECIALLY SELECTED” Agent/BROKER in many other REO’s and in this package it states the following:

9) Which title companies are the sellers and who do I make out the earnest money deposit to once offer is verbally accepted?

a. PLEASE LOOK ON MLX REMARKS FOR TITLE COMPANY. MLX WILL HAVE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

i. David Stern, P.A.

ii. Marshall C. Watson, P.A.

iii. Smith, Hiatt, & Diaz, P.A.

iv. Butler & Hosch, P.A.

v. Shapiro & Fishman, P.A.

vi. Spear & Hoffman, P.A.

vii. Adorno & Yoss, P.A.

viii. Watson Title

ix. New House Title (This is registered with FDLG address 9119 CORPORATE LAKE DRIVE, SUITE 300 TAMPA FL 33634)

10) Can the buyer use their own title company or must they use the title company selected by seller?

a. The buyer MUST HOLD ESCROW with Fannie Mae Title Company as stated on MLX.

NOW are we unleashing another dimension to this never ending SAGA?

We recently found out about WTF!!! DJSP Enterprises, Inc. Announces Agreement to Acquire Timios, Inc., Expand Presence Into 38 States , so is this a way for the Mills to Monopolize on the sales of these properties??

HERE IS same Agent/Broker for a FLORIDA DEFAULT LAW GROUP property:

THIS IS FANNIE MAE HOMEPATH PROPERTY.BANK OWNED.ALL OFFERS REQUIRING FINANCING MUST HAVE PREAPPROVAL LETTER. ALL CASH OFFERS REQUIRE PROOF OF FUNDS. THIS PROPERTY IS APPROVED FOR HOMEPATH AND HOMEPATH RENOVATION MORTGAGE FINANCING-AS LITTLE AS 3% DOWN,NO APPRAISAL OR MORTGAGE INSURANCE REQUIRED! ** FOR SHOWING INST PLEASE READ BROKER REMARKS** YOU MUST SUBMIT OFFER USING ATTACHMENT! INVESTORS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR FIRST 15DAYS.CLOSE BY JUNE 30 TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR EXTRA 3.5% SC. EMD: FL DEFAULT LAW GROUP.

Here is another same Agent/Broker for MARSHALL C. WATSON property:

FANNIE MAE OWNED.BANK PROPERTY. PROPERTY IS VACANT.ALL OFFERS REQUIRING FINANCING MUST HAVE PREAPPROVAL LETTER.ALL CASH OFFERS REQUIRE PROOF OF FUNDS(SEE ATTACHEMENT).THIS PROPERTY IS ELIGIBLE FOR HOME PATH RENOVATION MORTGAGE-AS LITTLE AS 3% DOWN.BUYER MUST CLOSE WITH SELLER CLOSING AGENT (LAW OFFICES OF MARSHALL C. WATSON).INVESTOR NOT ELIGIBLE FOR FIRST 15DAYS.*FOR SHOWING INSTR PLEASE READ BROKER REMARK* NOTE:OFFERS MUST BE SUBMITTED USING ATTACHMENT.CLOSE BY JUNE 30 TO GET 3.5% EXTRA IN CLOSING COST

Does the JUNE 30th Closing Day have any significance??

MAYBE it’s because of this? MERS May NOT Foreclose for Fannie Mae effective 5/1/2010 …I am just trying to make sense of this…Is there a grace period that followed?

• What “if” the BUYER selects their own Title company? Does this eliminate their chances of ever even being considered as a buyer?
• Why even bother to state this?
• Is this a way for the selected Agent/ Broker to find the buyer and discourage other agents or buyers from viewing?
• Was this at all even necessary to state?
• Is this verbiage to coerce agents to get a higher commission rather than pass down the incentive of 3.5% towards closing cost “if” under contract by 6/30?
• Why do investors have to refrain from buying for the first 15 days?

Coercion (pronounced /koʊˈɜrʃən/) is the practice of forcing another party to behave in an involuntary manner (whether through action or inaction) by use of threats, intimidation, trickery, or some other form of pressure or force. Such actions are used as leverage, to force the victim to act in the desired way. Coercion may involve the actual infliction of physical pain/injury or psychological harm in order to enhance the credibility of a threat. The threat of further harm may lead to the cooperation or obedience of the person being coerced. Torture is one of the most extreme examples of coercion i.e. severe pain is inflicted until the victim provides the desired information.

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LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES (LPS) BUYING UP HOMES AT AUCTIONS? Take a look to see if this address is on your documents!