Every once in a while, the term “shadow inventory” makes it into the business headlines. Invariably, stories warn of a looming flood of foreclosures that will drag the housing market down as soon as homeowners begin to feel optimistic again.
But what is shadow inventory — and is it really such a big threat?
Different experts have different definitions. Some only include homes that have already been repossessed by banks and are awaiting distressed sales. Others include those whose owners are long-overdue on mortgage payments, while others still count homes whose owners would like to sell but are waiting for conditions to improve.
8 Million More Foreclosures May Be Waiting
“The definition of shadow inventory has gotten out of control,” says Rick Sharga, senior vice president at RealtyTrac, an online market for distressed homes.
As a result, estimates of homes in the shadows vary widely between 2 million and 8 million. By comparison, approximately 5.5 million homes are expected to change hands this year, of which about a third are in some kind of distress.
High estimates usually include include repossessed homes that have not yet been listed for sale, homes that have been moved from the delinquent bucket and into foreclosure, and homes that are more than 60 days delinquent.
“Theoretically you could say up to 7 million homes are in the pipeline, but not all of them will go into the market and if even if they do, not all of them will hit at once,” says Sharga. Given the current pace of sales, Sharga believes shadow inventory could be cleared by the end of 2013, at which point the housing market can begin a real recovery.
Shadow Inventory Can Be Lethal
The problem with shadow inventory is that it does not simply represent additional supply. It’s supply of the worst kind: distressed homes that are often in hard-hit regions, often in a state of disrepair. Homes in foreclosure have more power to drag down real estate prices and keep them depressed for years to come.
“If you can buy a cheap foreclosed home next door to a normal home, many people will choose to buy the discounted home,” says Celia Chen, housing analyst at Moody’s Economy.com. She estimates that 4.6 million homes are currently waiting in the shadows, almost a whole year’s worth of housing supply.
Shadow Inventory Stuck In Limbo
Like many other analysts, Chen believes we still have a long way to go before real estate prices begin recovering. Some expect a recovery to begin in the middle of next year, others don’t see it coming for several more years.
There are many reasons that shadow inventory is so difficult to gauge.
For one thing, financial institutions that own distressed mortgages are not saying exactly how many homes they hold. Firms have generally been releasing their supply of distressed homes slowly into the market for fear of crushing prices.
Another problem is that nobody knows exactly how many homes will make it out of the government’s “Home Affordable Modification Program.” Chen estimates that only 45 percent of the 1.2 million loans that are aiming for a modification will actually succeed, while the rest will likely end up in foreclosure.
While these numbers certainly are cause for concern, the good news is that this shadow inventory is unlikely to cause a shock to the system similar to the initial crash.
No Nuclear Event in Housing
“Much as during the arms building between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, neither one ever launched a nuclear attack for fear of causing complete destruction,” says RealtyTrac’s Sharga. “You’re not going to see a nuclear event happen in the housing market either.”
Esmael Adibi, economics professor at Chapman University says shadow inventory is actually a good thing bcause it means that financial institutions – primarily lenders and investors who own the delinquent mortgages – are holding on to the inventory instead of dumping it into the market.
Adibi says financial institutions are not only holding on to their inventory in order to avoid crushing the market, but also because they believe they might get a better deal once prices have recovered slightly.
“Can you imagine if all those homes ended up in the market now?” he says. “Things would be much worse.”
(St. George, UT) June 5, 2010 – A court order issued by Fifth District Court Judge James L. Shumate May 22, 2010 in St. George, Utah has stopped all foreclosure proceedings in the State of Utah by Bank of America Corporation, ;
Recontrust Company, N.A; Home Loans Servicing, LP; Bank of America, FSB;http://www.envisionlawfirm.com. The Court Order if allowed to become permanent will force Bank of America and other mortgage companies with home loans in Utah to adhere to the Utah laws requiring lenders to register in the state and have offices where home owners can negotiate face-to-face with their lenders as the state lawmakers intended (Utah Code ‘ 57-1-21(1)(a)(i).). Telephone calls by KCSG News for comment to the law office of Bank of America counsel Sean D. Muntz and attorney Amir Shlesinger of Reed Smith, LLP, Los Angeles, CA and Richard Ensor, Esq. of Vantus Law Group, Salt Lake City, UT were not returned.
The lawsuit filed by John Christian Barlow, a former Weber State University student who graduated from Loyola University of Chicago and receive his law degree from one of the most distinguished private a law colleges in the nation, Willamette University founded in 1883 at Salem, Oregon has drawn the ire of the high brow B of A attorney and those on the case in the law firm of Reed Smith, LLP, the 15th largest law firm in the world.
Barlow said Bank of America claims because it’s a national chartered institution, state laws are trumped, or not applicable to the bank. That was before the case was brought before Judge Shumate who read the petition, supporting case history and the state statute asking for an injunctive relief hearing filed by Barlow. The Judge felt so strong about the case before him, he issued the preliminary injunction order without a hearing halting the foreclosure process. The attorney’s for Bank of America promptly filed to move the case to federal court to avoid having to deal with the Judge who is not unaccustomed to high profile cases and has a history of watching out for the “little people” and citizen’s rights.
The legal gamesmanship has begun with the case moved to federal court and Barlow’s motion filed to remand the case to Fifth District Court. Barlow said is only seems fair the Bank be required to play by the rules that every mortgage lender in Utah is required to adhere; Barlow said, “can you imagine the audacity of the Bank of America and other big mortgage lenders that took billions in bailout funds to help resolve the mortgage mess and the financial institutions now are profiting by kicking people out of them homes without due process under the law of the State of Utah.
Barlow said he believes his client’s rights to remedies were taken away from her by faceless lenders who continue to overwhelm home owners and the judicial system with motions and petitions as remedies instead of actually making a good-faith effort in face-to-face negotiations to help homeowners. “The law is clear in Utah,” said Barlow, “and Judge Shumate saw it clearly too. Mortgage lender are required by law to be registered and have offices in the State of Utah to do business, that is unless you’re the Bank of America or one of their subsidiary company’s who are above the law in Utah.”
Barlow said the Bank of America attorneys are working overtime filing motions to overwhelm him and the court. “They simply have no answer for violating the state statutes and they don’t want to incur the wrath of Judge Shumate because of the serious ramifications his finding could have on lenders in Utah and across the nation where Bank of America and other financial institutions, under the guise of a mortgage lender have trampled the rights of citizens,” he said.
“Bank of America took over the bankrupt Countrywide Home Loan portfolio June 3, 2009 in a stock deal that has over 1100 home owners in foreclosure in Utah this month alone, and the numbers keep growing,” Barlow said.
The second part of the motion, Barlow filed, claims that neither the lender, nor MERS*, nor Bank of America, nor any other Defendant, has any remaining interest in the mortgage Promissory Note. The note has been bundled with other notes and sold as mortgage-backed securities or otherwise assigned and split from the Trust Deed. When the note is split from the trust deed, “the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person or entity only holding the trust deed suffers no default because only the Note holder is entitled to payment. Basically, “[t]he security is worthless in the hands of anyone except a person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced.” Real Estate Finance Law (Fourth) § 5.27 (2002).
*MERS is a process that is designed to simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans. www.mersinc.org
A short payoff occurs when a borrower cannot pay the mortgage on his or her property and is permitted to sell the property for less than the total amount due, at a loss to the lender, investor and/or insurer. All parties consent to the mortgage being paid “short,” primarily because the property does not need to go through foreclosure. Please note that many legitimate short payoffs take place in the real estate market.
What is short payoff fraud?
According to a member of Freddie Mac’s Fraud Investigation Unit, a slight variation of our general definition of mortgage fraud also defines short payoff fraud – “Any misrepresentation or deliberate omission of fact that would induce the lender, investor or insurer to agree to the terms of a short payoff that it would not approve had all facts been known.” Misrepresentations in these schemes may include the buyer of the short payoff property, a subsequent transaction at a higher price, and/or the selling borrower’s hardship reason used to qualify for the short payoff. In many instances, the short payoff fraud will involve a “facilitator,” engaged by either the listing agent or the selling borrower, to assist with negotiating the transaction.
How is short payoff fraud committed?
There are many variations of short payoff fraud. The example below is just one way this type of mortgage fraud can occur.
A seller (delinquent borrower) owes $100,000 on a property that is worth $80,000.
The short payoff facilitator negotiates with the bank to accept a $70,000 offer to purchase the property. In several instances, Freddie Mac has seen that this offer will be made directly by the facilitator or through an entity under his/her control.
The lender/investor accepts the offer for $70,000.
The facilitator neglects to disclose to the lender/investor that there is an outstanding offer between the facilitator and a second end-buyer for $95,000.
Both transactions close on the same day with the net difference being pocketed by the facilitator and increasing the lender/investor’s net losses.
At first glance, this may look like a legitimate short payoff. However, in this example, the fraud is the failure to disclose the second, higher offer. The facilitator is willfully withholding important information the same way a scam artist would, and the lender does not realize they are walking into a premeditated short payoff fraud scheme. Because the facilitator is deliberately withholding the higher offer, Freddie Mac also experiences a larger than necessary loss on this sale.
Short Payoff Fraud Prevention Red Flags
Remain alert to the following flags, which may suggest short payoff fraud:
Sudden borrower default, with no prior delinquency history, and the borrower cannot adequately explain the sudden default.
The borrower is current on all other obligations.
The borrower’s financial information indicates conflicting spending, saving, and credit patterns that do not fit a delinquency profile.
The buyer of the property is an entity.
The purchase contract has an option clause to resell the property.
Short Payoff Fraud Prevention
The following protective measures are recommended in order to detect and mitigate the severity of short payoff fraud:
Review all short payoff documentation carefully, including the sale contract. This helps determine if there is an option clause to resell the property at a higher price without notifying the lender.
Draft a short payoff arm’s-length affidavit/disclosure notice for all parties involved in the short payoff to help avoid any hidden contracts, or side agreements. The parties involved should be, but are not limited to: the buyer, seller, listing agent, selling agent, short payoff negotiator(s)/facilitator(s), and closing agent.
Solicit information from your borrower.
Inquire if the borrower is aware of any other parties involved with the short payoff other than real estate professionals.
Is there a short payoff negotiator/facilitator involved?
Is the borrower aware of any other purchase contracts on the property?
Require an executed and signed IRS Form 4506-T, Request for Transcript of Tax Return,from each borrower and process the form to determine if the borrower’s qualifying income is accurate.
Order an interior Broker Price Opinion (BPO) and review all other BPOs that have been ordered on the property (drive-bys and full interiors) to establish a high/low value variance. The BPOs should include a past and present Multiple Listing Service (MLS) listing history, as this will determine if the property was relisted in MLS while the short payoff is being processed.
Review the Freddie Mac Exclusionary List to see if the parties to the short payoff are on the list. Seller/Servicers can access the Exclusionary List via the selling system, MIDANET®, MultiSuite®, and Loan Prospector®.
Immediately notify Freddie Mac if you are aware of a second purchase contract for a higher price.
Important Freddie Mac fraud prevention resources
Leverage the following resources for more information on dealing with fraud:
WASHINGTON – June 4, 2010 – The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is taking a closer look at the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act’s (RESPA) prohibition against the “required use” of affiliated settlement service providers. DinSFLA: They need to take a closer look if these were part of “Appraisal Fraud” & “Illegal Kickbacks”.
It violates RESPA if a consumer is required to use a particular mortgage lender, title company or other settlement service provider that’s affiliated with another business in their mortgage transaction. However, it’s less clear whether it’s a RESPA violation if it is offered as a discount or other incentive to steer them to a lender, title company, etc. DinSFLA: COERCION or not COERCE is the Question! I wonder what they would think of the Mills using their own title companies to close on their foreclosures? Any violations?
HUD is currently trying to determine if incentives violate the “required use” requirement. As part of the process, HUD published a notice about the issue and is seeking public comment.
HUD took the step because it has received a number of consumer complaints, many of which focused on a home builder that might reduce the cost of a home (by adding free construction upgrades or by discounting the home price) if the homebuyer uses the developer or builder’s affiliated mortgage lender. In some cases, the incentives may not represent true discounts if the homebuyers ultimately pay more in total loan costs.
According to HUD, consumers also say that the timing of the contract with the builder precludes them from shopping around, and the builder’s lender can then charge higher settlement costs or interest rates not competitive with non-affiliated lenders. HUD says that the steering of clients ” effectively violates” the “required use” ban in RESPA.
“It is our intent to keep an open mind on how to approach this vexing question over what is, and what is not, ‘required use,'” says David Stevens, HUD’s Assistant Secretary for Housing/Federal Housing Commissioner. “Clearly, consumers are complaining that they are being presented offers they believe they can’t refuse, and are essentially being required to use certain affiliated service providers.”
HUD’s current definition of “required use” reads:
“Required use means a situation in which a person must use a particular provider of a settlement service in order to have access to some distinct service or property, and the person will pay for the settlement service of the particular provider or will pay a charge attributable, in whole or in part, to the settlement service. However, the offering of a package or (combination of settlement services) or the offering of discounts or rebates to consumers for the purchase of multiple settlement services does not constitute a required use. Any package or discount must be optional to the purchaser. The discount must be a true discount below the prices that are otherwise generally available, and must not be made up by higher costs elsewhere in the settlement process.”
It is presently most visible in Europe as austerity programs that potentially could shred a half century of social entitlement advances are met with increasingly violent street demonstrations. It is seen in the US Tea Party rallies with their fury that the very fabric which the US capitalist system is based on is being destroyed and discarded. Unfortunately these demonstrations of rage are focusing on the effects and not the cause. The cause is a systemic plaque of unenforced financial control fraud.
Americans witnessed CEOs arrested during the nightly news coverage of the S&L Crisis of the early 90’s. They were placated as they heard the details of over 1000 indictments of the perpetrators of fraud. In the aftermath of the tech bubble implosion ten years later, injured investors once again witnessed the most senior executives at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest and others being led off in handcuffs and disgrace to waiting police cruisers. Retirees with decimated retirement plans felt that some level of restitution had been made when 25 year sentences were meted out to these formerly high-flying felons.
After nearly two years since the greatest financial malfeasants in history and ten years since the last public example of financial crime, the public haven’t seen a single CEO sentenced to hard time for the financial meltdown. They have not had their thirst for revenge quenched by a single high level court case. Instead, the public infuriatingly witnesses politically crafted theater in congressional hearings that go nowhere, read watered down legislation that is replete with even richer lobbyist-authored loopholes and only occasionally see small headlines of quiet settlements with insulting token amends payments. Why? Were there no crimes committed? No laws broken?
The public is forced to accept excuses that we have enforcement agencies not enforcing, regulators not regulating and legislators not equipped to legislate properly in our modern fast moving financial world. The public is left with the gnawing concern of whether it is incompetence or something much deeper, more troubling, and more sinister. Confidence and trust in government and our democratically elected politicians continue to worsen from already pathetic levels.
The taxpayer while standing in long unemployment lines, reads in the newspapers of financial institutions that were making mind-numbing profits and paying horrendous executive bonuses suddenly being insolvent and needing taxpayer bailouts. Then as their unemployment benefits near exhaustion, they read of the banks’ profits soaring once again. These are the foundations of the emerging new age of public rage.
We have much more than a crisis of integrity. We have fraud that is so pervasive that it is now unknowingly institutionalized into our business and political culture. The sickening part is that it a like a cancer; if it’s not detected early, it will be too late to fight. We need to fully understand and prosecute the tenets of fraud before it is too late.
FRAUD
Fraud is the act of creating trust then betraying it. Fraud is deceit.
If I was to articulate this definition to the average person, I believe the vast majority (without formal legal training) would immediately respond that this is exactly how they’d describe the financial crisis! So why are there no indictments? Is the fraud of liar’s loans, NINJA (No income, No Job, No Assets) loans, false housing appraisals, false AAA credit ratings and false contingent liability reporting so hard to prove? Not really. It takes an indictment and that’s often a much too political process in America.
Some would argue it was not intentional and therefore can’t be seen as a felony. They‘d say it is more a matter of civil damages. Again, wrong.
CONTROL FRAUD
What emerged from the S&P debacle was the concept of control fraud. At the core of financial control fraud is the notion that a CEO would deliberately use the S&L as a camouflage to make bad loans, thereby gutting the underwriting process while knowing full well that the loans would statistically fail over the long run. By doing this, money is made in the initial stages, exactly in the fashion of a Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme. Profits are declared and rich bonuses are paid. Stocks soar and rich stock options are executed. Then when the inevitable day arrives as the defaults emerge, the CEO takes the company into bankruptcy with no claw-back provisions, or an even newer and richer approach – the CEO seeks government bailouts to replace the pillaged balance sheet.
Corporate Control Fraud might be viewed as having four tell-tales:
1. Deliberately making bad loans or investments.
2. Exceptionally High Growth (because improperly accounted profits are being booked today).
3. The use of extraordinary leverage to maximize profits while profits are artificially available.
4. False representation of actuarial appropriate loss reserves.
Control fraud theory was developed in the savings and loan debacle. It explained that the person controlling the S&L (typically the CEO) posed a unique risk because he could use it as a weapon. The theory synthesized criminology (Wheeler and Rothman 1982), economics (Akerlof 1970), accounting, law, finance, and political science. It explained how a CEO optimized “his” S&L as a weapon to loot creditors and shareholders.
The weapon of choice was accounting fraud. The company is the perpetrator and a victim. Control frauds are optimal looters because the CEO has four unique advantages. He uses his ability to hire and fire to suborn internal and external controls and make them allies. Control frauds consistently get “clean” opinions for financial statements that show record profitability when the company is insolvent and unprofitable. CEOs choose top-tier auditors. Their reputation helps deceive creditors and shareholders.
Only the CEO can optimize the company for fraud. He has it invest in assets that have no clear market value. Professionals evaluate such assets-allowing the CEO to hire ones who will inflate values. Rapid growth (as in a Ponzi scheme) extends the fraud and increases the “take.” S&Ls optimized accounting fraud by loaning to uncreditworthy and criminal borrowers (who promised to pay the highest rates and fees because they did not intend to repay, but the promise sufficed for the auditors to permit booking the profits). The CEO extends the fraud through “sales” of the troubled assets to “straws” that transmute losses into profits. Accounting fraud produced guaranteed record profits-and losses.
CEOs have the unique ability to convert company assets into personal funds through normal corporate mechanisms. Accounting fraud causes stock prices to rise. The CEO sells shares and profits. The successful CEO receives raises, bonuses, perks, and options and gains in status and reputation. Audacious CEOs use political contributions to influence the external environment to aid fraud by fending off the regulators. Charitable contributions aid the firm’s legitimacy and the CEO’s status. S&L CEOs were able to loot the assets of large, rapidly growing organizations for many years. They used accounting fraud to mimic legitimate firms, and the markets did not spot the fraud. The steps that maximized their accounting profits maximized their losses, which dwarfed all other forms of property crimes combined. (1)
I have written extensively about the degree to which the banks 10K and 10Q balance sheets do not represent current fair market value of their assets. When the FDIC continuously takes over banks and declares that asset values are 25- 35% overvalued, there’s no further proof required. The banks, which are sold as part of the regular FDIC “Friday night bank lottery” continuously see no CEOs indicted for falsely representing FDIC-insured assets. We the taxpayers are then unwittingly presented with the tab.
Secretaries Paulson and Geithner subverted the PCA law by allowing failed banks to engage in massive accounting fraud (which also means they are engaged in securities fraud). Treasury is telling the world that resolving the failed banks will require roughly $2 trillion dollars. That has to mean that the failed banks are insolvent by roughly $2 trillion. The failed banks, however, are reporting that they are not simply solvent, but “well capitalized.” The regulators flout PCA by permitting this massive accounting and securities fraud. (Note that by countenancing this fraud they make it extremely difficult to ever prosecute these elite white-collar frauds.) (5)
Above, I made the assertion that indictments are too political a process in America. Control Fraud isn’t unique to just CEOs. Heads of sovereign governments and their empowered representatives also fall within this type of fraud. We once again see ourselves moving upwards hierarchically towards people in authority, who are charged with a fiduciary and judiciary responsibility, taking positions that enrich or politically benefit themselves at the expense of the innocent. This is fraud. Though we find ourselves asking, where are they when we most need them, we should be asking, who will bring them to justice?
If you think this is not widespread, how do you rationalize that it was recently reported that Goldman Sachs never had a trading day loss in April yet its clients in eight out of ten cases lost money. Incompetence? Stupidity? The Financial Times reports “The trading operations of Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chasemade money every single business day in the first quarter … Goldman’s trading desk recorded a profit of at least $25m(£16.8) on each of the quarter’s 63 working days, making more than $100m a day on 35 occasions, according to a regulatory filing issued on Monday … JPMorgan also achieved a loss-free quarter in its trading unit – making an average of $118m a day, nearly $5m an hour”. Morgan Stanley reported trading profits on a mere 93% of the first quarter trading days. This defies any sort of logic in a freely trading markets, unless the markets are controlled and the game fixed. These are better odds than owning a casino.
As A frustrated Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge observes: “if you ever wanted to see what a monopoly looks like in chart form:
The firm did not record a loss of even $0.01 on even one day in the last quarter,” Durden says. “The statistic probability of this event is itself statistically undefined. Goldman is now the market – or, in keeping with modern market reality, Goldman is the ‘house,’ it controls the casino, and always wins. Congratulations America: you now have far, far better odds in Las Vegas that you have making money with your E-Trade account.” (7)
The famous Barnum & Bailey carnival barkers used to snidely boast “there’s a sucker born every minute”. The carnival games were notoriously fixed so the ‘sucker’ almost certainly lost. I’m not indicting anyone here (I will leave that to our alarmingly incompetent regulatory and enforcement agencies), but rather I’m only reinforcing why we have entered an age of public rage and why I felt compelled to write the Extend & Pretend series of articles.
GRESHAM’S LAW
As the concept of control fraud emerged from the S&L crisis, an expansion of Gresham’s Law — has begun to be sketched out by Bill Black —
It will no doubt emerge out of this depression.
Gresham’s Law describes how “bad money drives out good.” Expanding on that idea, what Black calls “A Gresham’s Dynamic” operates similarly, when cheaters profit and “the dishonest drive out the honest.”
Dr. William Black, University of Missouri-Kansas City.
Thursday, Feb. 18th, 2010, 7:30-9:00 PM, at the Council Chamber.
The title of Dr. Black’s talk is: Why Elite Frauds Cause Recurrent, Intensifying Economic, Political and Moral Crises.
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO) ACT
Under RICO, a person who is a member of an enterprise that has committed any two of 35 crimes—27 federal crimes and 8 state crimes—within a 10-year period can be charged with racketeering. Racketeering activity includes:
Acts of terrorism(Financial –High Frequency ‘flash crash’ Trading?).
In addition, the racketeer must forfeit all ill-gotten gains and interest in any business gained through a pattern of “racketeering activity.” RICO also permits a private individual harmed by the actions of such an enterprise to file a civil suit; if successful, the individual can collect treble damages.
It seems it is the same names I continue to read about in the press. Do these financial institutions settle to avoid the magic ‘2 committed felony’ threshold qualification for a RICO indictment?
On March 29, 1989, financier Michael Milken was indicted on 98 counts of racketeering and fraud relating to an investigation into insider trading and other offenses. Milken was accused of using a wide-ranging network of contacts to manipulate stock and bond prices. It was one of the first occasions that a RICO indictment was brought against an individual with no ties to organized crime. Milken pled guilty to six lesser offenses rather than face spending the rest of his life in prison. On September 7, 1988, Milken’s employer, Drexel Burnham Lambert, was also threatened with a RICO indictment under the legal doctrine that corporations are responsible for their employees’ crimes. Drexel avoided RICO charges by pleading no contest to lesser felonies. While many sources say that Drexel pleaded guilty, in truth the firm only admitted it was “not in a position to dispute the allegations.” If Drexel had been indicted, it would have had to post a performance bond of up to $1 billion to avoid having its assets frozen. This would have taken precedence over all of the firm’s other obligations—including the loans that provided 96 percent of its capital. If the bond ever had to be paid, its shareholders would have been practically wiped out. Since banks will not extend credit to a firm indicted under RICO, an indictment would have likely put Drexel out of business. Is this really what is behind too big to fail prosecution? (6)
You don’t need a fancy high priced Philadelphia lawyer to tell you that “when the glove fits you can’t acquit!” – A little old fashion common sense is all that is required.
CONCLUSION
The Age of Rage during the French revolution cost people their heads when the guillotine administered public justice daily for the angry masses. Political and bureaucratic heads will also roll in the future if justice is not soon administered. As Marie Antoinette learned too late, it may be much worse than merely the loss of an elected position with all its trappings.
It takes public rage for someone to spend the time to create expressions of frustration like the above graphic represents!
Mr. Long is a former senior group executive with IBM & Motorola, a principle in a high tech public start-up and founder of a private venture capital fund. He is presently involved in private equity placements internationally along with proprietary trading involving the development & application of Chaos Theory and Mandelbrot Generator algorithms.
Gordon T Long is not a registered advisor and does not give investment advice. His comments are an expression of opinion only and should not be construed in any manner whatsoever as recommendations to buy or sell a stock, option, future, bond, commodity or any other financial instrument at any time. While he believes his statements to be true, they always depend on the reliability of his own credible sources. Of course, he recommends that you consult with a qualified investment advisor, one licensed by appropriate regulatory agencies in your legal jurisdiction, before making any investment decisions, and barring that, you are encouraged to confirm the facts on your own before making important investment commitments.
Gee, and here I thought that the Federal Reserve bought $1.4-$2 *trillion* of them! Let alone Lehman and its 50 billion in subprime mortgages that it “hid” (and what about all the other TARP/Federal Reserve member banks??)
n its latest quarterly report on credit conditions of the U.S. banking system, Moody’s Investors Service says banks’ asset quality issues are “past the peak” butcharge-offs and non-performers continue to eat away at profitability and sheer fundamentals.
Based on Moody’s market data, banks’ non-performing loans stood at 5.0 percent of total loan assets at March 31, 2010.
Moody’s says U.S. rated banks have already charged off or written-down $436 billion of loans in 2008, 2009, and the first quarter of 2010. That leaves another $307 billion to reach the rating agency’s full estimate of $744 billion of loan charge-offs from 2008 through 2011.
In aggregate, the banks have recognized 60 percent of Moody’s estimated total charge-offs and 65 percent of estimated residential mortgage losses, but only 45 percent of projected commercial real estate losses.
In the first quarter of this year, the banking industry’s collective annualized net charge-offs came to 3.3 percent of loans, versus 3.6 percent of loans in the fourth quarter
of 2009, Moody’s said. Despite two consecutive quarters of improvement in charge-offs, the ratings agency notes that the figures still remain near historic highs, dating back to the Great Depression.
According to Moody’s analysts, the decline in aggregate charge-offs was driven by commercial real estate improvement, which “we believe is likely to reverse in coming quarters,” they said in the report. A similar commercial real estate decline was experienced in the first quarter of 2009 before charge-offs accelerated through the rest of the year.
“The return to ‘normal’ levels of asset quality will be slow and uneven over the next 12 to 18 months,” said Moody’sSVP Craig Emrick.
But Emrick added that “Although remaining losses are sizable, they are beginning to look manageable in relation to bank’s loan loss allowances and tangible common equity.”
U.S. banks’ allowances for loan losses stood at $221 billion as of March 31, 2010, which is equal to 4.1 percent of loans, Moody’s reported. Although this can be used to offset a sizable portion of remaining charge-offs, banks will still require substantial provisions in 2010, the agency said.
Moody’s says its negative outlook for the U.S. banking system is driven by asset quality concerns and effects on profitability and capital. The agency’s ratings outlook is also influenced by the potential for a worse-than-expected macroeconomic environment, Moody’s said.
“More severe macroeconomic developments, the probability of which we place at 10 percent to 20 percent, would significantly strain U.S. bank fundamental credit quality,” Moody’s analysts wrote in their report.
THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 2010
CASE NOS.: SC09-1460 AND SC09-1579
IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – FORM 1.996
(FINAL JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE)
In light of the revised opinion, Ben-Ezra and Katz, P.A.’s Motion for Rehearing and Shapiro and Fishman, LLP’s Motion for Rehearing or Clarification are hereby
DENIED
IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
On Friday afternoon, May 28, 2010, an Arizona state court entered a restraining order cancelling a June 1, 2010 Trustee’s Sale of the borrower’s home which sale had been scheduled by Defendants MERS, Aurora Loan Servicing, and Quality Loan Service. The borrower presented evidence that the Notice of Trustee’s Sale prepared by Defendant QLS was fraudulent, as it claimed that the “current beneficiary” was Defendant Aurora when in fact the purported MERS assignment to Aurora did not occur until one month after the Notice of Trustee’s Sale was generated.
The borrower also cited to the Court the recent decision of the Arizona Bankruptcy Court in the matter of In Re Weisbrod, in which the Bankruptcy Court essentially stripped MERS of its purported authority and which case cites the In Re Sheridan decision from the Idaho Bankruptcy Court and others. The Weisbrod decision has been hailed as a rejection of the Blau and Cervantes pro-MERS decisions from 2009, and is in line and consistent with the findings of the Supreme Courts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Arkansas; the states courts of Vermont, Missouri, and South Carolina; and the Bankruptcy Courts of Idaho and Nevada which have dissected the purported expansion of MERS’ alleged “authority” in mortgages and Deeds of Trust where MERS on the one hand attempts to confine itself to “only a nominee” but later attempts to anoint itself with the power to assign mortgages and notes and institute or further foreclosures.
The great majority of the courts are finally starting to see though MERS’ facade and relegate MERS to what it really is: nothing more than an entity which tracks the transfer of mortgages.
The borrower is represented by Jeff Barnes, Esq., who prepared the litigation and memorandum of law, and local Arizona counsel Lynn Keeling, Esq. who obtained the restraining order.
Take a good look at the Buyer and the address in the document below. I investigated a little more and found multiple addresses below in forums and placed them here for you to see.
If you take a look at the Buyer in this Title the “Certificate Of Title” was issued under IndyMac Federal Bank…HUH? IndyMac FB does not exist…This seriously needs to be investigated! How are these being sold under failed banks?? Where does the money go after the auction and from the new sale?
Everyone needs to look at their documentation and look carefully for this address. If you have them under this address please forward them to StopForeclosureFraud@gmail.com.
OTHERS LISTED WITH 1270 Northland Dr. Ste 200 Mendota Heights, MN 55120
Fidelity National Foreclosure Solutions 1270 Northland Drive Suite 200.Mendota Heights, MN 55120 · (651)234-3500
Foreclosure & Bankruptcy Services. 1270 Northland Drive, Suite 200, Telephone, (651) 234-3500. Mendota Heights, MN 55120, Fax, (651) 234-3600 …
WELLS FARGO BANK NA TRUSTEE
1270 NORTHLAND DR SUITE 200
MENDOTA HEIGHTS, MN 55120
INSPECTOR: Eddie Prieto 274-5545
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
1270 NORTHLAND DR STE 200
MENDOTA HEIGHTS, MN 55120
INSPECTOR: RANDEL SMITH 274-5545
http://www.newspapernotice.com/details.aspx?id=1889632
Current Beneficiary: MERS as nominee for Aegis Mortgage Corp Care of / Servicer Aegis Mortgage Corp/Fidelity C/O Fidelity National Foreclosure Solutions 1270 Northland Drive. Suite 200 Mendota Heights, MN 55120
The information herein should not be taken as legal advice and is not a substitute for the assistance of a licensed advisor.
I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY.
Help the fight! Stopping Illegal Bank Foreclosure Fraud. Information on MERS and Bank Securitized Fraud cases resources.
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DISCLAIMER Pt 2
This BLOG provides information about the latest economy & fraud issues surrounding us all. Posts information comes from multiple sources including public records, other blogs, magazines, newspapers, real estate listing aggregators and, of course, a variety of sources who almost always choose to remain anonymous. Published content may include inaccurate information and no claims of accuracy by DinSFLA can or should be taken seriously by anyone. This BLOG is intended to be a voyeuristic, online experience only. DinSFLA asks that you do not chase down, visit, or disturb any person or property posted here because that would only make you a JERK. Seriously. Additionally, This blog makes no claims to the value, sale-ablility, structural integrity and etc. of any of the homes we discuss. We are simply sharing our sometimes many opinions of FRAUD and anyone who would be influenced in regards to purchasing a house based on some silly fraudulant things we write on this blog need to have a competent attorney look after your interest to be safe. Additionally, we do not take any responsibility for any dumb things might be said in the comments section and accept no liability for any loss, damage or any hurt feelings insensitive comments may incur. I do not prohibit anyone from speaking their mind...as long as it's not meant for DinSFLA! If you require any assistance please read "Welcome All" above :)
FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA 
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