POCKET CHANGE!! BofA’s Countrywide settles with FTC for $108 million

(Reuters) – Bank of America Corp has agreed to pay $108 million to settle government charges that its Countrywide unit, the mortgage lender that became synonymous with risky lending practices, bilked borrowers with misleading and excessive fees.

Housing Market

The Federal Trade Commission said two Countrywide mortgage servicing units deceived cash-strapped homeowners by overcharging them by hundreds or thousands of dollars, sometimes when they were already in bankruptcy.

The alleged activity took place before Bank of America acquired the distressed lender in 2008.

The settlement is a small win for regulators trying to hold to account those who contributed to the deep financial crisis.

The agency called the $108 million settlement one of the largest in an FTC case and the largest in a mortgage servicing case. The FTC has no jurisdiction over banks but does have jurisdiction over deceptive practices by non-bank financial services and products firms.

Countrywide, which was once the nation’s top mortgage lender, “profited from making risky loans to homeowners during the boom years, and then profited again when the loans failed,” said FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, noting that some fees during the foreclosure process were marked up more than 400 percent.

Bank of America said in a statement that it agreed to the settlement to void the expense and distraction of litigating the case. There was no admission of wrongdoing.

The FTC said the $108 million, which represents the amount consumers were overcharged, would be used to repay borrowers but could take months to sort out.

“The record-keeping of Countrywide was abysmal,” said Leibowitz. “Most frat houses have better record-keeping than Countrywide.”

In May, Countrywide agreed to a $624 million settlement of a class action lawsuit accusing it of misleading investors about its lending practices. The case was led by several pension funds, including the New York State Common Retirement Fund, that state’s $129.4 billion public pension fund, and five New York City pension funds.

Once the largest U.S. mortgage lender, Countrywide and its long-time chief executive, Angelo Mozilo, became known for risky lending practices that helped fuel the U.S. housing boom and subsequent bust.

Countrywide nearly collapsed as credit markets tightened, before Bank of America agreed to buy it in January 2008 in a stock deal valued at about $4 billion.

Mozilo and two other former Countrywide executives remain defendants in a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission civil fraud lawsuit.

The SEC alleges that Mozilo hid from investors the deteriorating prospects of Countrywide, and conducted insider trading by entering a systematic stock selling plan in late 2006, knowing that the mortgage lender’s prospects would worsen.

The SEC claimed Mozilo violated insider trading rules in generating a $139 million profit by exercising stock options in 2006 and 2007.

It said the exercises came after he admitted in an email to colleagues that Countrywide was “flying blind” as to the quality of its loans.

Sen. Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat and a member of the panel working out final wording on a comprehensive overhaul of Wall Street, called the FTC settlement “a major breakthrough that closes one of the ugliest chapters of the entire subprime mortgage crisis.”

“Anyone who believes the blame for the housing crisis rests with borrowers should read this settlement and learn just how shameless these lenders were during these years,” Schumer said.

(Additional reporting by Diane Bartz in Washington and by Joe Rauch in Charlotte; editing by John Wallace and Gerald E. McCormick)

BOMBSHELL – JUDGE ORDERS INJUNCTION STOPPING ALL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS BY BANK OF AMERICA; RECONTRUST; HOME LOAN SERVICING; MERS ET AL

Atomic Bomb

Via: 4ClosureFraud

(St. George, UT) June 5, 2010 – A court order issued by Fifth District Court Judge James L. Shumate May 22, 2010 in St. George, Utah has stopped all foreclosure proceedings in the State of Utah by Bank of America Corporation, ;

Judge James L. Shumate

Recontrust Company, N.A; Home Loans Servicing, LP; Bank of America, FSB;http://www.envisionlawfirm.com. The Court Order if allowed to become permanent will force Bank of America and other mortgage companies with home loans in Utah to adhere to the Utah laws requiring lenders to register in the state and have offices where home owners can negotiate face-to-face with their lenders as the state lawmakers intended (Utah Code ‘ 57-1-21(1)(a)(i).). Telephone calls by KCSG News for comment to the law office of Bank of America counsel Sean D. Muntz and attorney Amir Shlesinger of Reed Smith, LLP, Los Angeles, CA and Richard Ensor, Esq. of Vantus Law Group, Salt Lake City, UT were not returned.

The lawsuit filed by John Christian Barlow, a former Weber State University student who graduated from Loyola University of Chicago and receive his law degree from one of the most distinguished private a law colleges in the nation, Willamette University founded in 1883 at Salem, Oregon has drawn the ire of the high brow B of A attorney and those on the case in the law firm of Reed Smith, LLP, the 15th largest law firm in the world.

Barlow said Bank of America claims because it’s a national chartered institution, state laws are trumped, or not applicable to the bank. That was before the case was brought before Judge Shumate who read the petition, supporting case history and the state statute asking for an injunctive relief hearing filed by Barlow. The Judge felt so strong about the case before him, he issued the preliminary injunction order without a hearing halting the foreclosure process. The attorney’s for Bank of America promptly filed to move the case to federal court to avoid having to deal with the Judge who is not unaccustomed to high profile cases and has a history of watching out for the “little people” and citizen’s rights.

The legal gamesmanship has begun with the case moved to federal court and Barlow’s motion filed to remand the case to Fifth District Court. Barlow said is only seems fair the Bank be required to play by the rules that every mortgage lender in Utah is required to adhere; Barlow said, “can you imagine the audacity of the Bank of America and other big mortgage lenders that took billions in bailout funds to help resolve the mortgage mess and the financial institutions now are profiting by kicking people out of them homes without due process under the law of the State of Utah.

Barlow said he believes his client’s rights to remedies were taken away from her by faceless lenders who continue to overwhelm home owners and the judicial system with motions and petitions as remedies instead of actually making a good-faith effort in face-to-face negotiations to help homeowners. “The law is clear in Utah,” said Barlow, “and Judge Shumate saw it clearly too. Mortgage lender are required by law to be registered and have offices in the State of Utah to do business, that is unless you’re the Bank of America or one of their subsidiary company’s who are above the law in Utah.”

Barlow said the Bank of America attorneys are working overtime filing motions to overwhelm him and the court. “They simply have no answer for violating the state statutes and they don’t want to incur the wrath of Judge Shumate because of the serious ramifications his finding could have on lenders in Utah and across the nation where Bank of America and other financial institutions, under the guise of a mortgage lender have trampled the rights of citizens,” he said.

“Bank of America took over the bankrupt Countrywide Home Loan portfolio June 3, 2009 in a stock deal that has over 1100 home owners in foreclosure in Utah this month alone, and the numbers keep growing,” Barlow said.

The second part of the motion, Barlow filed, claims that neither the lender, nor MERS*, nor Bank of America, nor any other Defendant, has any remaining interest in the mortgage Promissory Note. The note has been bundled with other notes and sold as mortgage-backed securities or otherwise assigned and split from the Trust Deed. When the note is split from the trust deed, “the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person or entity only holding the trust deed suffers no default because only the Note holder is entitled to payment. Basically, “[t]he security is worthless in the hands of anyone except a person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced.” Real Estate Finance Law (Fourth) § 5.27 (2002).

*MERS is a process that is designed to simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans. www.mersinc.org

TRYING TO FORECLOSE on HOMEOWNER MORTGAGE with a “BORROWERS PROTECTION PLAN”: JONES v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

JONES v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

Kevin R. Jones, Plaintiff,

v.

Bank of America, N.A., Defendant.

No. CV-09-2129-PHX-JAT.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

June 1, 2010.

ORDER

JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Bank of America’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39). The Court has reviewed the parties’ filings and now rules on the Motion. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied as to Counts Three, Five, and Six, and granted as to Counts Two and Four. Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of his claims. In June and July 2006, Plaintiff Kevin Jones took out two mortgage loans on his residence located in Phoenix, Arizona. (Doc. #22, ¶¶7-8). At the time Plaintiff entered into the loan agreements with Defendant Bank of America, he also enrolled in the optional “Borrowers Protection Plan” (“the Plan”). (Id. at ¶9). The Plan provided that Defendant would cover Plaintiff’s monthly mortgage payments in the event that Plaintiff became disabled or involuntarily unemployed, in exchange for monthly premiums. (Id. at ¶10). On February 2, 2008, Plaintiff was in a car accident which caused him severe permanent injury and disability. (Id. at ¶13). As a result of his disability, Plaintiff was unable to continue working and making his mortgage payments. (Id. at ¶¶14-16). Plaintiff did, however, continue to make his premium payments and the Plan covered Plaintiff’s mortgage payments until “some point in the latter part of 2008 or in 2009.”1 ] (Id. at ¶¶17, 23). Defendant originally scheduled a Trustee sale for Plaintiff’s residence for November 9, 2009. (Id. at 1).

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on November 16, 2009, alleging breach of contract and tort claims. (Doc. #22). Defendant filed the instant motion on December 14, 2009, seeking to dismiss the tort claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. #39).

II. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only `fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. at 556, n.3 (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1202, at 94-95 (3d ed. 2004)).

“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dept. Of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal—both in the trial court and on appeal—is the complaint.” Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint lacks either a cognizable legal theory or facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. Count Two: Negligence

In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed a duty “to ensure that plaintiff’s contractual rights would be protected, and specifically that the Borrowers Protection Plan contractual benefits be honored.” (Doc. #22, ¶29). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached this duty and that Plaintiff was emotionally injured when the Defendant breached the Borrowers Protection Plan agreement. (Id. at ¶7). Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendant was negligent in breaching the contract. However, Plaintiff does not cite any legal authority indicating that Arizona recognizes a claim for negligent breach of contract, nor is the Court aware of any such authority. Seeing no cognizable legal theory to support this claim, the Motion to Dismiss Count two is granted.2 ] See Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699; Weisbuch, 119 F.3d at 783 n.1.

IV. Count Three: “Bad Faith/Breach of Contract”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing (“bad faith”). “Arizona law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 28 (Ariz. 2020). In the context of insurance contracts, “the insurance company must act in good faith in dealing with its insured on a claim.” Noble v. Nat’l Amer. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981). “The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Id.

1. Defendant as Insurer

Defendant is an insurer with respect to the Borrowers Protection Plan. “Tort actions for breach of covenants implied in certain types of contractual relationships are most often recognized where the type of contract involved is one in which the plaintiff seeks something more than commercial advantage or profit from the defendant. When dealing with . . . an insurer, the client/customer seeks service, security, peace of mind, protection or some other intangible.” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575 (Ariz. 1986).

Defendant argues that it is a lender and not an insurer. (Doc. #39, 6). This is true with respect to the mortgage loan agreements between Plaintiff and Defendant. However, Defendant created an insurer/insured relationship with Plaintiff, when the parties entered into the Borrowers Protection Plan agreements. Plaintiff alleges that in the Plan Defendant agreed, in exchange for premium payments, to indemnify Plaintiff by making his mortgage and interest payments in the event of certain covered events. (Doc. #22, ¶10). Defendant was thus offering precisely the type of protection and peace of mind described in Rawlings.3 ] Therefore, Defendant acted as an insurer and is subject to the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on insurers for purposes of the Borrowers Protection Plan.

2. Analysis of the Bad Faith Claim

Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts for his claim of bad faith to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. To state a claim for bad faith a plaintiff must offer facts to show “the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Noble, 624 P.2d at 868.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 15, 2006 and July 17, 2006, he and Defendant entered into the Borrowers Protection Plan agreements, which required him to pay monthly premiums in exchange for Defendant’s promise to pay his monthly loan and interest payments in the event of involuntary unemployment or disability. (Doc. #22, ¶¶7-11). Plaintiff further alleges that he made his premium payments as required and that he was in a car accident on February 2, 2008, which made him disabled and unable to work. (Id. at ¶11, 13-15). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant stopped making his mortgage payments “[a]t some point in the latter part of 2008 or in 2009,” and that Defendant “should have used the Plan to pay all of the principal and interest payments from March, 2008 to the present pursuant to the contract.” (Id. at ¶¶17, 22).

Because Plaintiff alleges that he paid his premiums and became disabled while protected under the Plan, Plaintiff has met the requirement that he plead an absence of a reasonable basis for the denial of his benefits. Furthermore, because Plaintiff alleges that he initially received benefits under the Plan, he has shown that Defendant had knowledge of his disability and unemployment. These facts meet the threshold standard of giving the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s bad faith claim.

V. Count Four: Wrongful Foreclosure

The Arizona state courts have not addressed whether they recognize the tort of wrongful foreclosure.4 ] Assuming for purposes of this Order that such a claim exists under Arizona law, for the claim to be ripe, a foreclosure sale must have occurred. See Standard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Schaible, 874 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A claim is fit for decision if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.”). Here, no foreclosure sale has yet taken place. Therefore, this claim is not ripe for adjudication and Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure is dismissed. Should the foreclosure sale occur, Plaintiff may move to amend the complaint to re-assert this claim.

VI. Count Five: Negligent Infliction of Mental Anguish

Arizona law recognizes two types of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The first type “requires plaintiff to: (1) witness an injury to a closely related person, (2) suffer mental anguish manifested as physical injury, and (3) be within the zone of danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm created by the defendant.” Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Bhurch, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc).

The second type of claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arises when the distress results from an injury to the claimant themself. See Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Arizona, 995 P.2d 735, 738-39 ¶¶ 7-8 (Ariz. App.1999) (holding negligent injection of radioactive material into plaintiff was sufficient to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress). To sustain this type of negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must show:

(a) [the tortfeasor] should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress . . ., and (b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 313 (adopted by Ball v. Prentice, 162 Ariz. 150, 781 P.2d 628, 630 (Ariz. Ct. App.1989)).

Carboun v. City of Chandler, 2005 WL 2408294 at 12.

Moreover, “the Arizona cases and Restatement § 436A make clear that a physical injury, as well as a long-term physical illness or mental disturbance, constitutes sufficient bodily harm to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Monaco, 995 P.2d at 739.

Plaintiff has not alleged the first type of negligent infliction of emotional distress because he has not alleged that he witnessed the injury of another person. However, Plaintiff does allege that he “has been in a state of emotional panic for over one-half year” as a result of Defendant’s threats to foreclose on [his] home loan. (Doc. #22 at ¶41). Plaintiff further alleges facts that show Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s physical disability5 ] and was indifferent to Plaintiff’s “rights and peace of mind” (Id. at ¶50). Construing the facts pleaded in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint liberally, this claim is sufficiently pleaded to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Defendant’s Motion is thus denied as to Plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (labeled “mental anguish”).

VII. Count Six: Intentional Infliction of Mental Anguish

To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arizona law, Plaintiff must show that: 1) Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; 2) Defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that emotional distress would result from the conduct; and 3) Plaintiff actually suffered emotional distress because of Defendant’s conduct. Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant attempted to foreclose on his home after failing to honor its obligations under the Borrowers Protection Plan. (Doc. #22, ¶¶46-47). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff through threatening letters and phone calls after Plaintiff’s counsel asked Defendant to direct communications to him instead. (Doc. #22, ¶¶41-42). Plaintiff asserts that these actions were in “conscious disregard of [his] rights and . . . peace of mind.” (Doc. #22, ¶50). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant’s conduct has caused him to be “in a state of emotional panic for over one-half year.” (Doc. #22, ¶48). Since Plaintiff is only required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim,” and need not provide detailed factual allegations, these facts are sufficient to give Defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is thus denied as to Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (labeled “mental anguish”).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39) is GRANTED as to Counts Two and Four of the Complaint, and that Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39) is DENIED as to Counts Three, Five, and Six of the Complaint.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

MASSIVE RULING TO PROTECT CALIFORNIA HOMEOWNERS FROM NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE: MABRY v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY‎ CODE 2923.5

From: b.daviesmd6605

PUBLISHED OPINION AT THE APPEALS LEVEL FOR CC 2923.5. IT IS THE LAW. THERE IS A FACT SPECIFIC CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THIS CALIFORNIA CODE. THIS IS A MASSIVE PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA FOR THE DEVIL DEEDS OF CC2924, NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE. MASSIVE POSITIVE FINALLY FOR HOMEOWNERS IN CALIFORNIA.

U.S. Banks WILL BE ‘Toast’ If Struggling Homeowners Keep Walking Away (VIDEO)

Huffington Post | Sherry Shen First Posted: 06- 2-10 05:11 PM | Updated: 06- 2-10 05:11 PM

Felix Salmon

click for video

Reuters blogger Felix Salmon believes that if more and more struggling homeowners continue walking away from their homes, U.S. banks could be “toast.”

As strategically defaults continue to rise, some homeowners are using their inability to pay their mortgage to live rent free — often for more than a year, the New York Times reported.

“Trying to renegotiate your mortgage is not a morally reprehensible thing to do,” Salmon said, pointing out that mainstream media organization’s like the New York Times magazine has been publishing columns about this trend and how it makes so much “financial sense.” Corporations walk away from commercial mortgages, Salmon said. “It’s not clear to me why an individual should behave any different,” Salmon said.

Wells Fargo is most exposed to the trend, affecting the bank’s livelihood. “Sand state” banks such as those in Florida and California are also far more exposed. Here’s more from Salmon:

“From the bank’s point of view, if this catches on, there’s a very large number of banks in this country who are just toast. And in hindsight they were just much better off dealing in a realistic way with these borrowers a year ago or two years ago when the problem first reeled its head instead of extending and pretending. Now they are in a pickle.”

“If this trend continues, then the banking system is probably insolvent,” he said.

RUN DON’T WALK AWAY! THE BANKS ARE BEGINNING TO FEEL IT!

If they had listened to us from the very beginning they would not have this problem. The FACT is that they suck and they don’t give a whoots ass about it’s customers. So one has to stand up to them and tell them… We are sick entired of being sick entired!

Maybe this will make you think twice about approving short sales and modifications much faster in the future. Regardless people READ what they put in front of you and DO NOT sign away any waiver to sue!

BofA: Mortgage Walkaways Have Huge Incentive

Published: Wednesday, 2 Jun 2010 | 1:14 PM ET

By: Diana Olick
CNBC Real Estate Reporter

This morning executives at Bank of America [BAC  15.90   0.46  (+2.98%)   ] rolled out their new “Principal Reduction Enhancement” program, which is an earned principal forgiveness plan for borrowers behind on their mortgages and whose loans are at least 20 percent underwater in value.

The plan is in conjunction with the government’s Home Affordable Modification Program, but the government’s principal reduction plan isn’t in place yet.

What makes BofA’s plan so proactive is that it employs, “a principal reduction as the first step toward reaching HAMP’s affordable payment target of 31 percent of household income when modifying certain NHRP-eligible mortgages — ahead of lowering the interest rate and extending the term.”

Why are they getting more aggressive on modifications?

Because more borrowers are walking away. Yes, I know we’ve talked about this forever on this blog and on CNBC, and the New York Times did a piece yesterday on it, and 60 Minutes did a piece on it a few weeks ago. The fact of the matter is it’s getting worse, and B of A execs are acknowledging that openly.

On the conference call to announce the program this morning, BofA’s credit loss mitigation executive, Jack Schakett, said the amount of strategic defaulters (those who can pay their loans but opt not to) are “more than we have ever experienced before.” He went on to say, “there is a huge incentive for customers to walk away because getting free rent and waiting out foreclosure can be very appealing to customers.”

Schakett says the foreclosure process is still taking 13 to 14 months (and by my estimates that’s an optimistic assessment), and so there’s over a year of free rent. While the banks are trying to improve the time, they’re just not there yet. DinSFLA: Perhaps because the longer it takes, the more the servicer makes! Even longer to have had a short sale approved.

31 percent of foreclosures in March were deemed to be “strategic default” by researchers at University of Chicago and Northwestern University.

That’s up from 22 percent in March of 2009.

We already know that mortgage walkaways are more prevalent among borrowers whose neighbors or friends have done the same thing.

We also learn from those same researchers that the likelihood of walking away increases by 23 percent when homeowners learn that a neighbor got some principal forgiveness.

I’ll let you all argue that one.

© 2010 CNBC, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Bank of America RECORDED CALL regarding FORECLOSURE FRAUD *MUST LISTEN*

I think this is what WE all go through!

jwerner79 — April 25, 2009 — This call happened 4/24/09 whereas a Countrywide representative called me, Jason Werner, literally while I was driving home from a pre-mediation conference. The loan amount is less than $50,000. This is a good example of a crime trying to be covered by the Treasury. Please see my comments to follow. Thank you.