BOMBSHELL – JUDGE ORDERS INJUNCTION STOPPING ALL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS BY BANK OF AMERICA; RECONTRUST; HOME LOAN SERVICING; MERS ET AL

Atomic Bomb

Via: 4ClosureFraud

(St. George, UT) June 5, 2010 – A court order issued by Fifth District Court Judge James L. Shumate May 22, 2010 in St. George, Utah has stopped all foreclosure proceedings in the State of Utah by Bank of America Corporation, ;

Judge James L. Shumate

Recontrust Company, N.A; Home Loans Servicing, LP; Bank of America, FSB;http://www.envisionlawfirm.com. The Court Order if allowed to become permanent will force Bank of America and other mortgage companies with home loans in Utah to adhere to the Utah laws requiring lenders to register in the state and have offices where home owners can negotiate face-to-face with their lenders as the state lawmakers intended (Utah Code ‘ 57-1-21(1)(a)(i).). Telephone calls by KCSG News for comment to the law office of Bank of America counsel Sean D. Muntz and attorney Amir Shlesinger of Reed Smith, LLP, Los Angeles, CA and Richard Ensor, Esq. of Vantus Law Group, Salt Lake City, UT were not returned.

The lawsuit filed by John Christian Barlow, a former Weber State University student who graduated from Loyola University of Chicago and receive his law degree from one of the most distinguished private a law colleges in the nation, Willamette University founded in 1883 at Salem, Oregon has drawn the ire of the high brow B of A attorney and those on the case in the law firm of Reed Smith, LLP, the 15th largest law firm in the world.

Barlow said Bank of America claims because it’s a national chartered institution, state laws are trumped, or not applicable to the bank. That was before the case was brought before Judge Shumate who read the petition, supporting case history and the state statute asking for an injunctive relief hearing filed by Barlow. The Judge felt so strong about the case before him, he issued the preliminary injunction order without a hearing halting the foreclosure process. The attorney’s for Bank of America promptly filed to move the case to federal court to avoid having to deal with the Judge who is not unaccustomed to high profile cases and has a history of watching out for the “little people” and citizen’s rights.

The legal gamesmanship has begun with the case moved to federal court and Barlow’s motion filed to remand the case to Fifth District Court. Barlow said is only seems fair the Bank be required to play by the rules that every mortgage lender in Utah is required to adhere; Barlow said, “can you imagine the audacity of the Bank of America and other big mortgage lenders that took billions in bailout funds to help resolve the mortgage mess and the financial institutions now are profiting by kicking people out of them homes without due process under the law of the State of Utah.

Barlow said he believes his client’s rights to remedies were taken away from her by faceless lenders who continue to overwhelm home owners and the judicial system with motions and petitions as remedies instead of actually making a good-faith effort in face-to-face negotiations to help homeowners. “The law is clear in Utah,” said Barlow, “and Judge Shumate saw it clearly too. Mortgage lender are required by law to be registered and have offices in the State of Utah to do business, that is unless you’re the Bank of America or one of their subsidiary company’s who are above the law in Utah.”

Barlow said the Bank of America attorneys are working overtime filing motions to overwhelm him and the court. “They simply have no answer for violating the state statutes and they don’t want to incur the wrath of Judge Shumate because of the serious ramifications his finding could have on lenders in Utah and across the nation where Bank of America and other financial institutions, under the guise of a mortgage lender have trampled the rights of citizens,” he said.

“Bank of America took over the bankrupt Countrywide Home Loan portfolio June 3, 2009 in a stock deal that has over 1100 home owners in foreclosure in Utah this month alone, and the numbers keep growing,” Barlow said.

The second part of the motion, Barlow filed, claims that neither the lender, nor MERS*, nor Bank of America, nor any other Defendant, has any remaining interest in the mortgage Promissory Note. The note has been bundled with other notes and sold as mortgage-backed securities or otherwise assigned and split from the Trust Deed. When the note is split from the trust deed, “the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person or entity only holding the trust deed suffers no default because only the Note holder is entitled to payment. Basically, “[t]he security is worthless in the hands of anyone except a person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced.” Real Estate Finance Law (Fourth) § 5.27 (2002).

*MERS is a process that is designed to simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans. www.mersinc.org

FULL Mortgage Payoff Rejected, Broken Entry (2), FORECLOSURE JUDGEMENT REVERSED…PRICELESS! Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., as Receiver of WAMU v. TRAVERSARI, 2010 Ohio 2406 – Ohio: Court of Appeals, 11th Dist., Geauga 2010

2010-Ohio-2406

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Traversari, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 2008-G-2859.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Geauga County.

May 28, 2010.

Karen L. Giffen and Kathleen A. Nitschke, Giffen & Kaminski, L.L.C., 1300 East Ninth Street, #1600, Cleveland, OH 44114 and Donald Swartz, Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, P.O. Box 580, Cincinnati, OH 45210-5480 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Edward T. Brice, Newman & Brice, L.P.A., 214 East Park Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Defendants-Appellants).

OPINION

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.

{¶1} Appellants, Robert Traversari (“Traversari”) and B & B Partners (“B & B”), appeal from the August 5, 2008 judgment entry of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Washington Mutual Bank, and entitling appellee to a judgment and decree in foreclosure.

{¶2} In 1994, appellant Traversari borrowed $190,000 from Loan America Financial Corporation which was memorialized by a promissory note and further secured by a mortgage on property located at 9050 Lake-in-the-Woods Trail, Bainbridge Township, Geauga County, Ohio. Appellant Traversari obtained the loan individually and/or in his capacity as the sole member and principal of appellant B & B, a real estate based company. The mortgage at issue was subsequently assigned to appellee.

{¶3} On January 8, 2007, appellee filed a complaint in foreclosure against appellants and defendants, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Charter One Bank, N.A., Jesse Doe, and Geauga County Treasurer. In count one of its complaint, appellee alleges that it is the holder and owner of a note in which appellant Traversari owes $149,919.96 plus interest at the rate of 7.75 percent per year from September 1, 2006, plus costs. In count two of its complaint, appellee alleges that it is the holder of a mortgage, given to secure payment of the note, which constitutes a valid first lien upon the real estate at issue. Appellee maintains that because the conditions of defeasance have been broken, it is entitled to have the mortgage foreclosed. Appellee indicated that appellant B & B may have claimed an interest in the property by virtue of being a current titleholder.

{¶4} Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim on February 16, 2007. In their defense, appellants maintain that appellee failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(D) and is estopped from asserting a foreclosure by its waiver of accepting payment. According to their counterclaim, appellants allege the following: on or about September 25, 2006, appellant Traversari sent a check in the amount of $150,889.96 to appellee for payment in full on the loan, which included the principal of $149.919.96 plus $970 of interest; on or about November 17, 2006, appellee issued a new home loan statement to appellant Traversari indicating the amount due was $5,608.95; appellant Traversari contacted appellee stating that a check had been sent for payment in full; appellee failed to respond; appellant Traversari mailed a check to appellee in the amount of $155,000; no stop payment was issued on the first check; because the house was vacant, appellant Traversari went to check the residence on December 26, 2006, and discovered that it had been broken into; an orange placard was placed on the premises indicating that a representative from appellee would secure the home; appellant Traversari immediately purchased new lock sets, secured the premises, and called and left a message for appellee to inform them to not enter the home; on December 31, 2006, electronic transmission was sent to appellee concerning the break-in and requested appellee to stop breaking into the home as well as to locate the two checks and to send a copy of a letter to a credit bureau; appellee did not respond; appellant Traversari then mailed a check from a separate account in the amount of the last payment demanded by appellee; appellee sent the $155,000 check back with a form letter to the address of the vacant property stating that personal checks were not accepted for payoff; appellee also rejected the $5,674.41 check; appellant Traversari then contacted appellee regarding the rejected checks; on January 11, 2007, appellant Traversari went to the home again, finding the kitchen door open, furnace running, new lock set taken out, garage door openers unplugged, and worse dings in the steel door; and appellant Traversari emailed appellee again, however, appellee indicated it could not give appellants any information because the case had been moved to foreclosure.

{¶5} Appellee filed a reply to appellants’ counterclaim on March 19, 2007, and an amended reply on September 6, 2007.

{¶6} According to the deposition of Maritza Torres (“Torres”), an employee of appellee in its senior asset recovery, loss prevention department, she was assigned to appellants’ case. Torres testified that appellee has no record of having received a check in the amount of $150,889.96 from appellant Traversari on September 25, 2006. However, she indicated that appellee received a check from appellant Traversari on September 30, 2006, in the amount of $102,538.74 (“Check #1”), which was returned to him due to appellee’s policy not to accept checks for early payoffs that are not certified funds.

{¶7} According to the deposition of Linda Rae Traversari (“Linda”), appellant Traversari’s wife, she is the handler of the family assets. Following the return of Check #1, appellee forwarded a delinquency letter to appellant Traversari in early November of 2006. Later that month, appellee sent a second default letter to him. Linda testified that on or around November 30, 2006, appellant Traversari sent another personal check for early payoff to appellee in the amount of $155,000 (“Check #2”). Appellee returned Check #2 with a letter explaining that noncertified funds are not accepted for early payoff. Linda stated that on January 2, 2007, appellant Traversari sent a third personal check via certified mail to appellee in the amount of $5,674.41 (“Check #3”). By the time appellee received Check #3, the loan had been referred to foreclosure. Check #3 was returned to appellant Traversari as “insufficient.”

{¶8} On March 14, 2008, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(b). Appellants filed a response on April 21, 2008.

{¶9} In its July 3, 2008 order, the trial court found, inter alia, that appellee was within its legal rights to reject the personal checks; appellee had the right to institute and maintain the foreclosure because appellants did not cure their default; and appellee had the right to enter the premises. Thus, the trial court indicated that appellee’s motion for summary judgment would be granted in its favor as to all issues and claims against appellants upon appellee’s presentation of an appropriate entry to be provided to the court.

{¶10} Appellee filed a “Motion For Submission Of Its Entry Granting Motion For Summary Judgment And Decree In Foreclosure” on July 11, 2008, and an amended entry on July 21, 2008. Appellants filed objections to appellee’s proposed amended entry the following day.

{¶11} Pursuant to its August 5, 2008 “Amended Entry Granting Summary Judgment And Decree In Foreclosure,” the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, entitling appellee to a judgment and decree in foreclosure. The trial court ordered, inter alia, that unless the sums found due to appellee are fully paid within 3 days from the date of the decree, the equity of redemption shall be foreclosed, the property sold, and an order of sale issued to the Sheriff directing him to appraise, advertise, and sell the property. The trial court further ordered that the proceeds of the sale follow the following order of priority: (1) to the Clerk of Courts, the costs of the action, including the fees of appraisers; (2) to the County Treasurer, the taxes and assessments, due and payable as of the date of transfer of the property after Sheriff’s Sale; (3) to appellee, the sum of $149,919.96, with interest at the rate of 7.75 percent per annum from September 1, 2006 to February 29, 2008, and 7.25 percent per annum from March 1, 2008 to present, together with advances for taxes, insurance, and costs; and (4) the balance of the sale proceeds, if any, shall be paid by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court to await further orders. It is from that judgment that appellants filed the instant appeal, raising the following assignment of error for our review:

{¶12} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANTSA-PPELLANTS IN ITS ORDER GRANTING IN PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S FAVOR AS TO ALL ISSUES AND CLAIMS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS, AND ITS AMENDED ENTRY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECREE IN FORECLOSURE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.”

{¶13} In their sole assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, and entitling appellee to a judgment and decree in foreclosure.

{¶14} “This court reviews de novo a trial court’s order granting summary judgment.” Hudspath v. Cafaro Co., 11th Dist. No. 2004-A-0073, 2005-Ohio-6911, at ¶8, citing Hapgood v. Conrad, 11th Dist. No. 2000-T-0058, 2002-Ohio-3363, at ¶13. “`A reviewing court will apply the same standard a trial court is required to apply, which is to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Id.

{¶15} “Since summary judgment denies the party his or her `day in court’ it is not to be viewed lightly as docket control or as a `little trial.’ The jurisprudence of summary judgment standards has placed burdens on both the moving and the nonmoving party. In Dresher v. Burt [(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296,] the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the moving party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim. The evidence must be in the record or the motion cannot succeed. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case but must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden outlined in the last sentence of Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the nonmoving party based on the principles that have been firmly established in Ohio for quite some time in Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112 ***.” Welch v. Ziccarelli, 11th Dist. No. 2006-L-229, 2007-Ohio-4374, at ¶40.

{¶16} “The court in Dresher went on to say that paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108 ***, is too broad and fails to account for the burden Civ.R. 56 places upon a moving party. The court, therefore, limited paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing to bring it into conformity with Mitseff. (Emphasis added.)” Id. at ¶41.

{¶17} “The Supreme Court in Dresher went on to hold that when neither the moving nor nonmoving party provides evidentiary materials demonstrating that there are no material facts in dispute, the moving party is not entitled a judgment as a matter of law as the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, `and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.’ Id. at 276. (Emphasis added.)” Id. at ¶42.

{¶18} In the case at bar, the record establishes that appellant Traversari sent personal checks to appellee for payment on the loan at issue. However, appellee returned the checks with letters indicating they would not be accepted as payment because they were not certified, and foreclosure proceedings commenced.

{¶19} There is no genuine issue of material fact that appellants executed and delivered a note and mortgage to appellee. However, a genuine issue of material fact does exist with regard to the fact that appellant Traversari tendered the entire principal payment and appellee rejected it because the payment was made by personal check. See Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Smith, 11th Dist. No. 2007-P-0097, 2008-Ohio-5451, at ¶19. The dates and amounts of the personal checks are conflicting due to the testimony and/or evidence submitted by the parties.

{¶20} “A cause of action exists on behalf of a damaged mortgagor when, in conformity with the terms of his note, he offers to the mortgagee full payment of the balance of the principal and interest, and the mortgagee refuses to present the note and mortgage for payment and cancellation.” Cotofan v. Steiner (1959), 170 Ohio St. 163, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶21} Appellant Traversari did not place any conditions on the personal checks tendered to appellee. We note that “[t]he essential characteristics of a tender are an unconditional offer to perform, coupled with ability to carry out the offer and production of the subject matter of the tender.” Walton Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Assns. Conventions, Tradeshows, Inc. (June 11, 1992), 10th Dist. No. 91AP-1458, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3081, at 5. (Emphasis sic.)

{¶22} “It is an implied condition of every contract that one party will not prevent or impede performance by the other. If he does prevent or impede performance, whether by his prior breach or other conduct, he may not then insist on performance by the affected party, and he cannot maintain an action for nonperformance if the promises are interdependent.” Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assns. v. Banks (Feb. 20, 1990), 2d Dist. No. 11667, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 638, at 8-9, citing 17 American Jurisprudence 2d, Contracts, Sections 425, 426.

{¶23} In the instant matter, paragraph 3 of the Open-End Mortgage provides:

{¶24} “3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be applied: first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2; third; to interest due; fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note.”

{¶25} Here, there was no new note and mortgage, nor agreement for application of payments, when the mortgage at issue was subsequently assigned from Loan America Financial Corporation to appellee. Rather, it was the policy of appellee to require mortgagors to pay by certified check for any amounts over $5,000. According to appellee’s employee, Torres, she indicated that any amount over $5,000 not paid by certified funds puts the company at risk because it can take anywhere between 7 to 10 days for a personal check to clear. We note, however, that the mortgagee has up to 90 days to verify the sufficiency of the underlying funds before satisfying and releasing its recorded mortgage. R.C. 5301.36(B). In the instant case, it would have been reasonable for appellee to have either waited 7 to 10 days for appellant Traversari’s checks to clear or to have inquired with his bank, see, generally, Hunter Sav. Assn. v. Kasper (Sept. 25, 1979), 10th Dist. No. 78AP-774, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 11777, at 13, if there were sufficient funds before returning any of his 3 personal checks and commencing foreclosure proceedings.

{¶26} The lender in this case unilaterally refused the debtor’s payment by check due to itsinternal policy that an amount over $5,000 had to be made by certified check. The terms and conditions of the mortgage, however, do not impose such a requirement. Under paragraph 3 of the Open-End Mortgage, it appears the lender had an obligation to apply the payment tendered, by personal check or otherwise. Its refusal to present the check for clearance and apply the payment on the ground of internal policy appears to have violated the debtor’s rights.

{¶27} Construing the evidence submitted most strongly in favor of appellants, we must conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain. Again, a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the fact that appellant Traversari tendered the entire principal payment and appellee rejected it because the payment was made by personal check. Also, the dates and amounts of the personal checks are conflicting due to the testimony and/or evidence submitted by the parties. Thus, the trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

{¶28} For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ sole assignment of error is well-taken. The judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is ordered that appellee is assessed costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

Trapp, P.J., Rice, J., concur.

Defendants are not named parties to the instant appeal.

The matter was stayed. On November 26, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was substituted for appellee Washington Mutual Bank. This court instructed the Clerk of Courts to correct the docket by removing “Washington Mutual Bank” and substituting “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank” as appellee in this appeal. The stay order automatically dissolved on August 29, 2009.

TRYING TO FORECLOSE on HOMEOWNER MORTGAGE with a “BORROWERS PROTECTION PLAN”: JONES v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

JONES v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

Kevin R. Jones, Plaintiff,

v.

Bank of America, N.A., Defendant.

No. CV-09-2129-PHX-JAT.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

June 1, 2010.

ORDER

JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Bank of America’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39). The Court has reviewed the parties’ filings and now rules on the Motion. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied as to Counts Three, Five, and Six, and granted as to Counts Two and Four. Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of his claims. In June and July 2006, Plaintiff Kevin Jones took out two mortgage loans on his residence located in Phoenix, Arizona. (Doc. #22, ¶¶7-8). At the time Plaintiff entered into the loan agreements with Defendant Bank of America, he also enrolled in the optional “Borrowers Protection Plan” (“the Plan”). (Id. at ¶9). The Plan provided that Defendant would cover Plaintiff’s monthly mortgage payments in the event that Plaintiff became disabled or involuntarily unemployed, in exchange for monthly premiums. (Id. at ¶10). On February 2, 2008, Plaintiff was in a car accident which caused him severe permanent injury and disability. (Id. at ¶13). As a result of his disability, Plaintiff was unable to continue working and making his mortgage payments. (Id. at ¶¶14-16). Plaintiff did, however, continue to make his premium payments and the Plan covered Plaintiff’s mortgage payments until “some point in the latter part of 2008 or in 2009.”1 ] (Id. at ¶¶17, 23). Defendant originally scheduled a Trustee sale for Plaintiff’s residence for November 9, 2009. (Id. at 1).

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on November 16, 2009, alleging breach of contract and tort claims. (Doc. #22). Defendant filed the instant motion on December 14, 2009, seeking to dismiss the tort claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. #39).

II. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only `fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. at 556, n.3 (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1202, at 94-95 (3d ed. 2004)).

“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dept. Of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal—both in the trial court and on appeal—is the complaint.” Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint lacks either a cognizable legal theory or facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. Count Two: Negligence

In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed a duty “to ensure that plaintiff’s contractual rights would be protected, and specifically that the Borrowers Protection Plan contractual benefits be honored.” (Doc. #22, ¶29). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached this duty and that Plaintiff was emotionally injured when the Defendant breached the Borrowers Protection Plan agreement. (Id. at ¶7). Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendant was negligent in breaching the contract. However, Plaintiff does not cite any legal authority indicating that Arizona recognizes a claim for negligent breach of contract, nor is the Court aware of any such authority. Seeing no cognizable legal theory to support this claim, the Motion to Dismiss Count two is granted.2 ] See Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699; Weisbuch, 119 F.3d at 783 n.1.

IV. Count Three: “Bad Faith/Breach of Contract”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing (“bad faith”). “Arizona law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 28 (Ariz. 2020). In the context of insurance contracts, “the insurance company must act in good faith in dealing with its insured on a claim.” Noble v. Nat’l Amer. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981). “The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Id.

1. Defendant as Insurer

Defendant is an insurer with respect to the Borrowers Protection Plan. “Tort actions for breach of covenants implied in certain types of contractual relationships are most often recognized where the type of contract involved is one in which the plaintiff seeks something more than commercial advantage or profit from the defendant. When dealing with . . . an insurer, the client/customer seeks service, security, peace of mind, protection or some other intangible.” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575 (Ariz. 1986).

Defendant argues that it is a lender and not an insurer. (Doc. #39, 6). This is true with respect to the mortgage loan agreements between Plaintiff and Defendant. However, Defendant created an insurer/insured relationship with Plaintiff, when the parties entered into the Borrowers Protection Plan agreements. Plaintiff alleges that in the Plan Defendant agreed, in exchange for premium payments, to indemnify Plaintiff by making his mortgage and interest payments in the event of certain covered events. (Doc. #22, ¶10). Defendant was thus offering precisely the type of protection and peace of mind described in Rawlings.3 ] Therefore, Defendant acted as an insurer and is subject to the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on insurers for purposes of the Borrowers Protection Plan.

2. Analysis of the Bad Faith Claim

Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts for his claim of bad faith to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. To state a claim for bad faith a plaintiff must offer facts to show “the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Noble, 624 P.2d at 868.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 15, 2006 and July 17, 2006, he and Defendant entered into the Borrowers Protection Plan agreements, which required him to pay monthly premiums in exchange for Defendant’s promise to pay his monthly loan and interest payments in the event of involuntary unemployment or disability. (Doc. #22, ¶¶7-11). Plaintiff further alleges that he made his premium payments as required and that he was in a car accident on February 2, 2008, which made him disabled and unable to work. (Id. at ¶11, 13-15). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant stopped making his mortgage payments “[a]t some point in the latter part of 2008 or in 2009,” and that Defendant “should have used the Plan to pay all of the principal and interest payments from March, 2008 to the present pursuant to the contract.” (Id. at ¶¶17, 22).

Because Plaintiff alleges that he paid his premiums and became disabled while protected under the Plan, Plaintiff has met the requirement that he plead an absence of a reasonable basis for the denial of his benefits. Furthermore, because Plaintiff alleges that he initially received benefits under the Plan, he has shown that Defendant had knowledge of his disability and unemployment. These facts meet the threshold standard of giving the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s bad faith claim.

V. Count Four: Wrongful Foreclosure

The Arizona state courts have not addressed whether they recognize the tort of wrongful foreclosure.4 ] Assuming for purposes of this Order that such a claim exists under Arizona law, for the claim to be ripe, a foreclosure sale must have occurred. See Standard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Schaible, 874 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A claim is fit for decision if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.”). Here, no foreclosure sale has yet taken place. Therefore, this claim is not ripe for adjudication and Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure is dismissed. Should the foreclosure sale occur, Plaintiff may move to amend the complaint to re-assert this claim.

VI. Count Five: Negligent Infliction of Mental Anguish

Arizona law recognizes two types of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The first type “requires plaintiff to: (1) witness an injury to a closely related person, (2) suffer mental anguish manifested as physical injury, and (3) be within the zone of danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm created by the defendant.” Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Bhurch, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc).

The second type of claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arises when the distress results from an injury to the claimant themself. See Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Arizona, 995 P.2d 735, 738-39 ¶¶ 7-8 (Ariz. App.1999) (holding negligent injection of radioactive material into plaintiff was sufficient to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress). To sustain this type of negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must show:

(a) [the tortfeasor] should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress . . ., and (b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 313 (adopted by Ball v. Prentice, 162 Ariz. 150, 781 P.2d 628, 630 (Ariz. Ct. App.1989)).

Carboun v. City of Chandler, 2005 WL 2408294 at 12.

Moreover, “the Arizona cases and Restatement § 436A make clear that a physical injury, as well as a long-term physical illness or mental disturbance, constitutes sufficient bodily harm to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Monaco, 995 P.2d at 739.

Plaintiff has not alleged the first type of negligent infliction of emotional distress because he has not alleged that he witnessed the injury of another person. However, Plaintiff does allege that he “has been in a state of emotional panic for over one-half year” as a result of Defendant’s threats to foreclose on [his] home loan. (Doc. #22 at ¶41). Plaintiff further alleges facts that show Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s physical disability5 ] and was indifferent to Plaintiff’s “rights and peace of mind” (Id. at ¶50). Construing the facts pleaded in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint liberally, this claim is sufficiently pleaded to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Defendant’s Motion is thus denied as to Plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (labeled “mental anguish”).

VII. Count Six: Intentional Infliction of Mental Anguish

To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arizona law, Plaintiff must show that: 1) Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; 2) Defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that emotional distress would result from the conduct; and 3) Plaintiff actually suffered emotional distress because of Defendant’s conduct. Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant attempted to foreclose on his home after failing to honor its obligations under the Borrowers Protection Plan. (Doc. #22, ¶¶46-47). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff through threatening letters and phone calls after Plaintiff’s counsel asked Defendant to direct communications to him instead. (Doc. #22, ¶¶41-42). Plaintiff asserts that these actions were in “conscious disregard of [his] rights and . . . peace of mind.” (Doc. #22, ¶50). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant’s conduct has caused him to be “in a state of emotional panic for over one-half year.” (Doc. #22, ¶48). Since Plaintiff is only required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim,” and need not provide detailed factual allegations, these facts are sufficient to give Defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is thus denied as to Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (labeled “mental anguish”).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39) is GRANTED as to Counts Two and Four of the Complaint, and that Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39) is DENIED as to Counts Three, Five, and Six of the Complaint.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

FINALLY!!! Supreme Court of Florida DENIES FORECLOSURE MILLS Ben-Ezra and Katz, P.A.’s Motion for Rehearing and Shapiro and Fishman, LLP’s Motion for Rehearing

via 4ClosureFraud

RE: Verification of Complaints

NO MORE EXCUSES

Supreme Court of Florida

THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 2010
CASE NOS.: SC09-1460 AND SC09-1579
IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – FORM 1.996
(FINAL JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE)

In light of the revised opinion, Ben-Ezra and Katz, P.A.’s Motion for Rehearing and Shapiro and Fishman, LLP’s Motion for Rehearing or Clarification are hereby

DENIED

IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

REVISED

VICTORY IN ARIZONA: COURT STOPS SALE WHERE BORROWER PRESENTED EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT NOTICE OF TRUSTEE’S SALE

May 31, 2010

On Friday afternoon, May 28, 2010, an Arizona state court entered a restraining order cancelling a June 1, 2010 Trustee’s Sale of the borrower’s home which sale had been scheduled by Defendants MERS, Aurora Loan Servicing, and Quality Loan Service. The borrower presented evidence that the Notice of Trustee’s Sale prepared by Defendant QLS was fraudulent, as it claimed that the “current beneficiary” was Defendant Aurora when in fact the purported MERS assignment to Aurora did not occur until one month after the Notice of Trustee’s Sale was generated.

The borrower also cited to the Court the recent decision of the Arizona Bankruptcy Court in the matter of In Re Weisbrod, in which the Bankruptcy Court essentially stripped MERS of its purported authority and which case cites the In Re Sheridan decision from the Idaho Bankruptcy Court and others. The Weisbrod decision has been hailed as a rejection of the Blau and Cervantes pro-MERS decisions from 2009, and is in line and consistent with the findings of the Supreme Courts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Arkansas; the states courts of Vermont, Missouri, and South Carolina; and the Bankruptcy Courts of Idaho and Nevada which have dissected the purported expansion of MERS’ alleged “authority” in mortgages and Deeds of Trust where MERS on the one hand attempts to confine itself to “only a nominee” but later attempts to anoint itself with the power to assign mortgages and notes and institute or further foreclosures.

The great majority of the courts are finally starting to see though MERS’ facade and relegate MERS to what it really is: nothing more than an entity which tracks the transfer of mortgages.

The borrower is represented by Jeff Barnes, Esq., who prepared the litigation and memorandum of law, and local Arizona counsel Lynn Keeling, Esq. who obtained the restraining order.

Jeff Barnes, Esq., www.ForeclosureDefenseNationwide.com

ANOTHER FLORIDA REVERSAL 2nd DCA: DAVID B. HOWELL and DAVE B. HOWELL, LLC, Appellants, v. ED BEBB, INC., Appellee. 2nd District. Case No. 2D09-3664. Opinion filed May 28, 2010 REVERSED & REMANDED

HOWELL v. ED BEBB, INC.

DAVID B. HOWELL and DAVE B. HOWELL, LLC, Appellants,

v.

ED BEBB, INC., Appellee.

Case No. 2D09-3664.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 28, 2010.

Matthew J. Conigliaro, Annette Marie Lang, and Stephanie C. Zimmerman of Carlton Fields, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellants.

Thomas C. Saunders of Saunders Law Group, Bartow, for Appellee.

WHATLEY, Judge.

David B. Howell and Dave B. Howell, LLC (collectively referred to as Howell) filed this direct appeal of a final summary judgment to quiet title and for ejectment entered in favor of Ed Bebb, Inc. We conclude that Bebb did not establish that it was entitled to summary judgment at this stage in the pleadings and reverse.

Bebb filed an amended complaint against Howell asserting counts to quiet title, take possession of real property, require specific performance, foreclose on a mortgage, and for ejectment. Howell filed a motion to dismiss, and while the motion was pending, Bebb filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on Bebb’s motion, the circuit court entered final summary judgment in favor of Bebb.

Generally, “[a] movant is entitled to summary judgment `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'” Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 928 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)). But if “a plaintiff moves for summary judgment before the defendant has filed an answer, `the burden is upon the plaintiff to make it appear to a certainty that no answer which the defendant might properly serve could present a genuine issue of fact.'” BAC Funding Consortium Inc. ISAOA/ATIMA v. Jean-Jacques, 28 So. 3d 936, 937-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (quoting Settecasi v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Pinellas County, 156 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)). Thus, the standard to establish entitlement to summary judgment requires the plaintiff to establish that “the defendant could not raise any genuine issues of material fact if the defendant were permitted to answer the complaint.” Id. at 938.

The trial court in the present case appears to have used the wrong standard in ruling on Bebb’s motion for summary judgment, as it asked Howell if he had filed any affidavits or anything that would create a material issue of fact. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Howell noted issues of material fact that could be raised in an answer to the complaint. However, Bebb based its argument for summary judgment on the failure of Howell to file affidavits establishing genuine issues of material fact. On appeal, Bebb does not contend that it established to a certainty at the hearing that no answer which Howell might properly serve could present a genuine issue of fact.

Accordingly, it was improper to enter summary judgment in favor of Bebb at this stage in the pleadings, and we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

BANK OF AMERICA channels BRITNEY SPEARS “OOPS I DID IT AGAIN”: Foreclosing AGAIN on a MORTGAGE FREE HOME!

ARE YOU NEXT?

"Oops I did it Again"

Tuolumne Woman Owns Home Outright

POSTED: 3:58 pm PDT May 26, 2010
UPDATED: 5:53 pm PDT May 26, 2010

TUOLUMNE, Calif. — Nancy Willmes paid cash for her Tuolumne home in 2001. So she was quite surprised when Bank of America send her a notice of default on the property in February.

“I honestly felt like Bank of America was trying to steal my property,” Willmes said.

She contacted Bank of America to try to find out why the bank believed it could foreclose on property she had purchased outright.

Willmes has chain-of-ownership records, which show Bank of America had sold the property to Fannie Mae years earlier. Fannie Mae foreclosed on the previous owner, and Willmes purchased the property with cash from Fannie Mae.

But Willmes said Bank of America did not care about the documentation.

The bank proceeded with the foreclosure, placing ads in the local paper and nailing a foreclosure notice to her door.

“I called the title company, the title company called B of A, and they refused to rescind it,” Willmes said.
Fearful she would lose her home to the bank, Willmes called KCRA Call 3, and a Call 3 volunteer contacted Bank of America.

Willmes said that’s when Bank of America began returning her phone calls.

The bank rescinded the notice of trustee sale, stopping the foreclosure.

In a statement to KCRA 3, Bank of America said the problem was a system error. It said it updated its records and canceled the sale.

“This is my whole life. This is my future,” Willmes said. “I’ve got to thank you guys for basically giving me back my home. That is a big relief.”

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