FREDDIE MAC WARNS ABOUT SHORT SALE FRAUD PARTICIPATION

Attorneys & Realtors especially need to listen up to this…

For a perfect example of this, here is a story about the Short Sale Kid in Florida who has raised many questions.

What is a short payoff?

A short payoff occurs when a borrower cannot pay the mortgage on his or her property and is permitted to sell the property for less than the total amount due, at a loss to the lender, investor and/or insurer. All parties consent to the mortgage being paid “short,” primarily because the property does not need to go through foreclosure. Please note that many legitimate short payoffs take place in the real estate market.

What is short payoff fraud?

According to a member of Freddie Mac’s Fraud Investigation Unit, a slight variation of our general definition of mortgage fraud also defines short payoff fraud – “Any misrepresentation or deliberate omission of fact that would induce the lender, investor or insurer to agree to the terms of a short payoff that it would not approve had all facts been known.” Misrepresentations in these schemes may include the buyer of the short payoff property, a subsequent transaction at a higher price, and/or the selling borrower’s hardship reason used to qualify for the short payoff. In many instances, the short payoff fraud will involve a “facilitator,” engaged by either the listing agent or the selling borrower, to assist with negotiating the transaction.

How is short payoff fraud committed?

There are many variations of short payoff fraud. The example below is just one way this type of mortgage fraud can occur.

  • A seller (delinquent borrower) owes $100,000 on a property that is worth $80,000.
  • The short payoff facilitator negotiates with the bank to accept a $70,000 offer to purchase the property. In several instances, Freddie Mac has seen that this offer will be made directly by the facilitator or through an entity under his/her control.
  • The lender/investor accepts the offer for $70,000.
  • The facilitator neglects to disclose to the lender/investor that there is an outstanding offer between the facilitator and a second end-buyer for $95,000.
  • Both transactions close on the same day with the net difference being pocketed by the facilitator and increasing the lender/investor’s net losses.

At first glance, this may look like a legitimate short payoff. However, in this example, the fraud is the failure to disclose the second, higher offer. The facilitator is willfully withholding important information the same way a scam artist would, and the lender does not realize they are walking into a premeditated short payoff fraud scheme. Because the facilitator is deliberately withholding the higher offer, Freddie Mac also experiences a larger than necessary loss on this sale.

Short Payoff Fraud Prevention Red Flags

Remain alert to the following flags, which may suggest short payoff fraud:

  • Sudden borrower default, with no prior delinquency history, and the borrower cannot adequately explain the sudden default.
  • The borrower is current on all other obligations.
  • The borrower’s financial information indicates conflicting spending, saving, and credit patterns that do not fit a delinquency profile.
  • The buyer of the property is an entity.
  • The purchase contract has an option clause to resell the property.

Short Payoff Fraud Prevention

The following protective measures are recommended in order to detect and mitigate the severity of short payoff fraud:

  • Review all short payoff documentation carefully, including the sale contract. This helps determine if there is an option clause to resell the property at a higher price without notifying the lender.
  • Draft a short payoff arm’s-length affidavit/disclosure notice for all parties involved in the short payoff to help avoid any hidden contracts, or side agreements. The parties involved should be, but are not limited to: the buyer, seller, listing agent, selling agent, short payoff negotiator(s)/facilitator(s), and closing agent.
  • Solicit information from your borrower.
  • Inquire if the borrower is aware of any other parties involved with the short payoff other than real estate professionals.
  • Is there a short payoff negotiator/facilitator involved?
  • Is the borrower aware of any other purchase contracts on the property?
  • Require an executed and signed IRS Form 4506-T, Request for Transcript of Tax Return,from each borrower and process the form to determine if the borrower’s qualifying income is accurate.
  • Order an interior Broker Price Opinion (BPO) and review all other BPOs that have been ordered on the property (drive-bys and full interiors) to establish a high/low value variance. The BPOs should include a past and present Multiple Listing Service (MLS) listing history, as this will determine if the property was relisted in MLS while the short payoff is being processed.
  • Review the Freddie Mac Exclusionary List to see if the parties to the short payoff are on the list. Seller/Servicers can access the Exclusionary List via the selling system, MIDANET®, MultiSuite®, and Loan Prospector®.
  • Immediately notify Freddie Mac if you are aware of a second purchase contract for a higher price.

Important Freddie Mac fraud prevention resources

Leverage the following resources for more information on dealing with fraud:

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Tracking Loans Through a Firm That Holds Millions: MERS

Kevin P. Casey for The New York Times: Darlene and Robert Blendheim of Seattle are struggling to keep their home after their subprime lender went out of business.

By MIKE McINTIRE NYTimes
Published: April 23, 2009

Judge Walt Logan had seen enough. As a county judge in Florida, he had 28 cases pending in which an entity called MERS wanted to foreclose on homeowners even though it had never lent them any money.

Into the Mortgage NetherworldGraphicInto the Mortgage Netherworld

MERS, a tiny data-management company, claimed the right to foreclose, but would not explain how it came to possess the mortgage notes originally issued by banks. Judge Logan summoned a MERS lawyer to the Pinellas County courthouse and insisted that that fundamental question be answered before he permitted the drastic step of seizing someone’s home.

Daniel Rosenbaum for The New York Times R. K. Arnold, MERS president, said the company helped reduce mortgage fraud and imposed order on the industry.

“You don’t think that’s reasonable?” the judge asked.

“I don’t,” the lawyer replied. “And in fact, not only do I think it’s not reasonable, often that’s going to be impossible.”

Judge Logan had entered the murky realm of MERS. Although the average person has never heard of it, MERS — short for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems — holds 60 million mortgages on American homes, through a legal maneuver that has saved banks more than $1 billion over the last decade but made life maddeningly difficult for some troubled homeowners.

Created by lenders seeking to save millions of dollars on paperwork and public recording fees every time a loan changes hands, MERS is a confidential computer registry for trading mortgage loans. From an office in the Washington suburbs, it played an integral, if unsung, role in the proliferation of mortgage-backed securities that fueled the housing boom. But with the collapse of the housing market, the name of MERS has been popping up on foreclosure notices and on court dockets across the country, raising many questions about the way this controversial but legal process obscures the tortuous paths of mortgage ownership.

If MERS began as a convenience, it has, in effect, become a corporate cloak: no matter how many times a mortgage is bundled, sliced up or resold, the public record often begins and ends with MERS. In the last few years, banks have initiated tens of thousands of foreclosures in the name of MERS — about 13,000 in the New York region alone since 2005 — confounding homeowners seeking relief directly from lenders and judges trying to help borrowers untangle loan ownership. What is more, the way MERS obscures loan ownership makes it difficult for communities to identify predatory lenders whose practices led to the high foreclosure rates that have blighted some neighborhoods.

In Brooklyn, an elderly homeowner pursuing fraud claims had to go to court to learn the identity of the bank holding his mortgage note, which was concealed in the MERS system. In distressed neighborhoods of Atlanta, where MERS appeared as the most frequent filer of foreclosures, advocates wanting to engage lenders “face a challenge even finding someone with whom to begin the conversation,” according to a report by NeighborWorks America, a community development group.

To a number of critics, MERS has served to cushion banks from the fallout of their reckless lending practices.

“I’m convinced that part of the scheme here is to exhaust the resources of consumers and their advocates,” said Marie McDonnell, a mortgage analyst in Orleans, Mass., who is a consultant for lawyers suing lenders. “This system removes transparency over what’s happening to these mortgage obligations and sows confusion, which can only benefit the banks.”

A recent visitor to the MERS offices in Reston, Va., found the receptionist answering a telephone call from a befuddled borrower: “I’m sorry, ma’am, we can’t help you with your loan.” MERS officials say they frequently get such calls, and they offer a phone line and Web page where homeowners can look up the actual servicer of their mortgage.

In an interview, the president of MERS, R. K. Arnold, said that his company had benefited not only banks, but also millions of borrowers who could not have obtained loans without the money-saving efficiencies it brought to the mortgage trade. He said that far from posing a hurdle for homeowners, MERS had helped reduce mortgage fraud and imposed order on a sprawling industry where, in the past, lenders might have gone out of business and left no contact information for borrowers seeking assistance.

“We’re not this big bad animal,” Mr. Arnold said. “This crisis that we’ve had in the mortgage business would have been a lot worse without MERS.”

About 3,000 financial services firms pay annual fees for access to MERS, which has 44 employees and is owned by two dozen of the nation’s largest lenders, including Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo. It was the brainchild of the Mortgage Bankers Association, along with Fannie MaeFreddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, the mortgage finance giants, who produced a white paper in 1993 on the need to modernize the trading of mortgages.

At the time, the secondary market was gaining momentum, and Wall Street banks and institutional investors were making millions of dollars from the creative bundling and reselling of loans. But unlike common stocks, whose ownership has traditionally been hidden, mortgage-backed securities are based on loans whose details were long available in public land records kept by county clerks, who collect fees for each filing. The “tyranny of these forms,” the white paper said, was costing the industry $164 million a year.

“Before MERS,” said John A. Courson, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association, “the problem was that every time those documents or a file changed hands, you had to file a paper assignment, and that becomes terribly debilitating.”

Although several courts have raised questions over the years about the secrecy afforded mortgage owners by MERS, the legality has ultimately been upheld. The issue has surfaced again because so many homeowners facing foreclosure are dealing with MERS.

Advocates for borrowers complain that the system’s secrecy makes it impossible to seek help from the unidentified investors who own their loans. Avi Shenkar, whose company, the GMA Modification Corporation in North Miami Beach, Fla., helps homeowners renegotiate mortgages, said loan servicers frequently argued that “investor guidelines” prevented them from modifying loan terms.

“But when you ask what those guidelines are, or who the investor is so you can talk to them directly, you can’t find out,” he said.

MERS has considered making information about secondary ownership of mortgages available to borrowers, Mr. Arnold said, but he expressed doubts that it would be useful. Banks appoint a servicer to manage individual mortgages so “investors are not in the business of dealing with borrowers,” he said. “It seems like anything that bypasses the servicer is counterproductive,” he added.

When foreclosures do occur, MERS becomes responsible for initiating them as the mortgage holder of record. But because MERS occupies that role in name only, the bank actually servicing the loan deputizes its employees to act for MERS and has its lawyers file foreclosures in the name of MERS.

The potential for confusion is multiplied when the high-tech MERS system collides with the paper-driven foreclosure process. Banks using MERS to consummate mortgage trades with “electronic handshakes” must later prove their legal standing to foreclose. But without the chain of title that MERS removed from the public record, banks sometimes recreate paper assignments long after the fact or try to replace mortgage notes lost in the securitization process.

This maneuvering has been attacked by judges, who say it reflects a cavalier attitude toward legal safeguards for property owners, and exploited by borrowers hoping to delay foreclosure. Judge Logan in Florida, among the first to raise questions about the role of MERS, stopped accepting MERS foreclosures in 2005 after his colloquy with the company lawyer. MERS appealed and won two years later, although it has asked banks not to foreclose in its name in Florida because of lingering concerns.

Last February, a State Supreme Court justice in Brooklyn, Arthur M. Schack, rejected a foreclosure based on a document in which a Bank of New York executive identified herself as a vice president of MERS. Calling her “a milliner’s delight by virtue of the number of hats she wears,” Judge Schack wondered if the banker was “engaged in a subterfuge.”

In Seattle, Ms. McDonnell has raised similar questions about bankers with dual identities and sloppily prepared documents, helping to delay foreclosure on the home of Darlene and Robert Blendheim, whose subprime lender went out of business and left a confusing paper trail.

“I had never heard of MERS until this happened,” Mrs. Blendheim said. “It became an issue with us, because the bank didn’t have the paperwork to prove they owned the mortgage and basically recreated what they needed.”

The avalanche of foreclosures — three million last year, up 81 percent from 2007 — has also caused unforeseen problems for the people who run MERS, who take obvious pride in their unheralded role as a fulcrum of the American mortgage industry.

In Delaware, MERS is facing a class-action lawsuit by homeowners who contend it should be held accountable for fraudulent fees charged by banks that foreclose in MERS’s name.

Sometimes, banks have held title to foreclosed homes in the name of MERS, rather than their own. When local officials call and complain about vacant properties falling into disrepair, MERS tries to track down the lender for them, and has also created a registry to locate property managers responsible for foreclosed homes.

“But at the end of the day,” said Mr. Arnold, president of MERS, “if that lawn is not getting mowed and we cannot find the party who’s responsible for that, I have to get out there and mow that lawn.”

Q & A: What’s Next for Fannie and Freddie? WSJ

MAY 24, 2010, 9:53 AM ET

By Nick Timiraos

It turns out that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, already becoming the most expensive legacy for taxpayers from the financial crisis, aren’t just too big too fail. As my column in Monday’s WSJ explains, they’re also proving too tough to reform.

Here’s a closer look at five common questions about what’s happening with—and what’s next for—Fannie and Freddie:

1. Why doesn’t the financial-overhaul bill address Fannie and Freddie?

The Obama administration says it’s too soon to take action to address the future of the housing-finance giants because markets are still fragile, and others have said the bill is already too complex without Fannie and Freddie in the mix.

Revamping the housing-finance giants, which own or guarantee around half of the nation’s $10.3 trillion in home mortgages, was never going to be easy. But the fact that, together with the Federal Housing Administration, the companies guaranteed 96.5% of all new mortgages last quarter has made the challenge only greater.

During the debate on financial-overhaul legislation, Republicans proposed measures that would have wound down the companies and limited the amount of further government aid. But the amendments didn’t specify what would take the place of Fannie and Freddie.

Both parties are “ignoring the issue,” says Lawrence White, an economics professor at New York University. Yes, markets may be too fragile for action now, but he says a plan now would give markets time to prepare for the future.

2. Why are Fannie and Freddie still losing money?

The companies have taken $145 billion in handouts, including $19 billion this quarter, from the U.S. Treasury so far, and that number could rise as foreclosures mount. Each quarter, as more mortgages go delinquent, Fannie and Freddie have to set aside more cash in reserve to cover losses if those loans end up defaulting and the homes they’re secured by go through foreclosure.

Nearly all of those defaults are coming from loans that the companies made during and immediately after the housing boom. Loans today have significantly tighter lending standards and should be profitable.

While losses could continue for several quarters, there are signs that delinquencies may have peaked during the first quarter. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each said that the number of its loans that were seriously delinquent fell in March, from February.

3. Why is the government still putting money into the companies?

Each quarter, the government injects new money into Fannie and Freddie to keep the companies afloat. That allows the firms to meet their obligations to investors, which keeps the mortgage market moving. If the government decided to stop keeping the firms afloat, that could send borrowing costs up sharply for future homeowners and could create new shocks for the housing market.

In February 2009, the Obama administration said it would double to $200 billion the amount of aid it was willing to put into each of the two firms. Then in December, it said it would waive those limits, and allow for unlimited sums over the next three years. The companies are now akin to government housing banks, with an independent regulator, but one that ultimately must answer to the Treasury Department, which controls the purse strings.

The current arrangement has raised concerns that the companies could continue to make business decisions that might lead to higher losses and that they wouldn’t be making if they were still being run for private shareholders. “Unregulated pots of money—that was a cause of their demise, and now we’ve taken that monster and turned it into a super-monster” with little independent oversight, says David Felt, a former senior lawyer at the companies’ federal regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

What would the mortgage market look like today without government support?

Consider the market for “jumbo” loans, or those too large for government backing. Rates on jumbos are around 0.6 percentage points higher than conforming loans. That’s nearly double the historical spread, but an improvement over the peak 1.8 percentage point spread during the financial crisis.

Lending standards are also much tighter for loans without government backing, and 30-year fixed rate loans are much less common. Mike Farrell, chief executive of Annaly Capital Management, estimates that mortgage rates today would be two to three percentage points higher without government guarantees.

What will ultimately happen to Fannie and Freddie?

Congress has to decide what it wants the housing-finance system of the future to do. “Everyone acknowledges that the model is broken, that the model was flawed, yet we don’t know how to run a mortgage market without them and we have nothing with which to replace the broken system,” says Howard Glaser, a Clinton administration housing official and housing-industry consultant.

Still, a consensus is growing between some academics and policymakers that the government will continue to play some role at least in backstopping mortgages. Recent testimony from top administration officials over some general insight into what the administration wants the future system to do.

What will ultimately happen to Fannie and Freddie?

Congress has to decide what it wants the housing-finance system of the future to do. “Everyone acknowledges that the model is broken, that the model was flawed, yet we don’t know how to run a mortgage market without them and we have nothing with which to replace the broken system,” says Howard Glaser, a Clinton administration housing official and housing-industry consultant.

Still, a consensus is growing between some academics and policymakers that the government will continue to play some role at least in backstopping mortgages. Recent testimony from top administration officials over some general insight into what the administration wants the future system to do.

There have been other clues: The Obama administration has made clear its view that the failure of Fannie and Freddie shouldn’t be pinned on government affordable-housing mandates, which suggests that any future housing-finance entities would continue to serve a role supporting that function. And an administration report on the foreclosure crisis said that better regulation of the entire mortgage market, and not just any government-related entities, would be a “high priority” for the future.

Readers, what do you think the government should do with the firms?

Activists Help Homeless Families Shop Around for Foreclosed Houses

mmflint — May 17, 2010 — “This is not Fannie May’s house, this is not Freddie Mac’s house. This is public housing and should be used as public housing.” — Max Rameau, Take Back the Land

This is not Freddie Mac’s website: http://www.michaelmoore.com

Calling on MERS “In fact, all the paper in the process is gone”.: Scott Cooley

Calling on MERS

VIENNA, VIRGINIA–BASED MERS IS A great example of how technological solutions can work for the betterment of our industry. MERS’story is more typical, though, in terms of how long it took the company’s solution to become mainstream.

I’ve found that typically new technologies or new technology firms take five to seven years to become successful in this industry. Of course, it is difficult for startup companies to last that long, which is one of the main reasons there is such a high failure rate among these firms. From the start, MERS had widespread support from the Mortgage Bankers Association(MBA) and all the major mortgage companies. Originally, MERS wasn’t well-funded ($5.2 million), but in 1998 it was recapitalized with significant contributions from MBA, FannieMae and Freddie Mac—mostly interms of a line of credit. Still, it took five to seven years until MERS wash and handling millions of loans. Today, it has handled more than 30 million loans and just launched it’s next endeavor, called the MERS® eRegistry. It’s a great success story overall.

MERS’ eRegistry for eNotes was started in March 2003 (see http://www.mersinc.org for details). Its purpose is to provide a“pointer” to the location of the eNote, and it holds the legal identity of the controller. Any lender can then find the vault where the eNote is stored, as well as who controls it.

MERS provides the very valuable solution of tracking the eNote’s location without trying to compete with the private industry for all of the other actions that occur around an eNote, such as storage in a vault. By MERS’ own admission, this solution will take years before it becomes mainstream.

R.K. Arnold, MERS’ president and chief executive officer, stated at the time of the eRegistry’s launch, “Although it will take many years for the industry to fully adopt this system, it will become widely used because the market place is demanding a move toward less paper in the home-buying process.” As you might guess, I’ll say it will take five to seven years.

I applaud MERS in taking this step and for building the eRegistry in short order. Still, I’m calling on MERS to take it to the next level. In its current form, I expect the eRegistry might save the industry a few dollars per loan. Yet, MERS is so close to providing the one key component of a solution that I believe will save the industry hundreds of dollars per loan. This solution is what I call the virtual loan folder (VLF), and I consider it the holy grail of mortgage technology.

VLF is the use of an electronic vault where the entire loan file is stored—not just the note but every document from all the various parties. MERS would be the pointer so the industry’s computer systems will know where to look to post, retrieve or just view a document. Every person involved in the loan process would use the VLF. A few examples follow.

■ Realtor: The Realtor would post a purchase agreement and other supporting documents, and might also view the Good Faith Estimate to know about the terms of the loan.

■ Loan Officer: The loan officer would post the loan application and other supporting origination documents. He or she would also retrieve documents such as the appraisal, preliminary title and credit report.

■ Borrower: The borrower could view his or her predisclosure and closing documents, and could post documents such as a copy of a W-2.

■ Appraiser: The appraiser could view the loan application and would post the entire appraisal.

■ Loan Underwriter: The underwriter could view all of the documents and post a list of conditions.

■ Loan Closer: The closer could view the upfront disclosures and post the entire closing package.

■ Loan Servicer: The servicer could view all of the documents, even while talking on the phone with the borrower, at any time during the life of the loan.

Today, most of the aforementioned parties are shipping the documents at great cost through carriers such as Federal Express. With VLF, all such shipping and the manual handling of the traditional loan folder is eliminated. In fact, all the paper in the process is gone. Yes, this is a form of imaging that some mortgage companies are using today. However, it goes much further, in that it would be used by all parties involved with each loan. In addition, it would also store the electronic data file of the loan and do so in a Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization Inc . (MISMO) format.

All of the software systems in use by our industry would need to be modified to support the VLF system. Each system (such as title plant software, Realtor systems, appraiser software, loan origination systems, etc.) wouldinterface to the VLF to store and retrieve the documents and the data.

MERS is an important piece because it contributes to marketplace competition and adds validity to the system. The known problem with the VLF system is that if the vault is owned by a single entity, the power of that entity would become enormous (generating almost unlimited profits).

There have been reports that the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have considered promoting the development of a VLF system for the industry, and they would then own the vault. However, it’s better if we have many vaults that would each compete on price and service. MERS would simply provide the pointer for every VLF. The vault would charge fees for posting and retrieving documents. Having many vaults would keep such transaction fees to a bare minimum. If MERS adopts a VLF solution, I believe the industry would move faster to adoption. MERS would certainly add validity to the concept, and it would push others to build the needed technological pieces.

Another significant contribution that MERS provides is the industry-standard MERS Identification Number (MIN). The MIN is more crucial than it might otherwise seem, because it’s the only way to uniquely assign an identification number for every new loan originated. Without the MIN, it would be almost impossible for all the computer systems to correctly identify each loan for such circumstances as a borrower applying for the same home loan with two different mortgage companies at the same time.

The step MERS has taken with eRegistry is a good one, but it’s just a baby step in terms of what needs to be done. I challenge MERS to announce a broader initiative with the hope of having something tangible in a year or so. From that  point in time, I know it’ll be five to seven years before the industry will be operating far more efficiently, and originating loans for about half the cost of what it takes today, in my opinion.

Scott Cooley is an independent mortgage technology consultant, analyst and author based in Los Gatos, California. He  can be reached at scooley@scooley.com.

M O R T G A G E B A N K I N G . J U L Y 2 0 0 5

R E P R I N T E D  W I T H  P E R M I S S I O N  F R O M  T H E  M O R T G A G E  B A N K E R S  A S S O C I A T I O N  ( M B A )

Florida AG investigating LPS subsidiary: Jacksonville Business Journal

Monday, May 17, 2010, 1:50pm EDT  |  Modified: Monday, May 17, 2010, 1:51pm

Jacksonville Business Journal – by Christian Conte Staff Writer

The Florida Attorney General’s Office has launched a civil investigation similar to one launched by a Florida U.S. Attorney’s Office against Fidelity National Financial Inc. and Lender Processing Services Inc., along with an LPS subsidiary, relating to possible forged documents in foreclosure cases.

According to the Attorney General’s website, DOCX LLC, based in Alpharetta, Ga., “seems to be creating and manufacturing ‘bogus assignments’ of mortgage in order that foreclosures may go through more quickly and efficiently. These documents appear to be forged, incorrectly and illegally executed, false and misleading. These documents are used in court cases as ‘real’ documents of assignment and presented to the court as so, when it actually appears that they are fabricated in order to meet the documentation to foreclosure according to law.”

The Attorney General’s Economic Crimes Division in Fort Lauderdale is handling the case.

Fidelity National Financial (NYSE: FNF), based in Jacksonville, provides title insurance, specialty insurance, claims management services and information services. Lender Processing Services (NYSE: LPS), also based in Jacksonville, provides mortgage processing services, settlement services, mortgage performance analytics and default solutions.

Fidelity National acquired DOCX, which processes and files lien releases and mortgage assignments for lenders, in 2005.

The U.S. Attorney’s office launched its investigation of DOCX in February.

LPS stated in its 2009 annual report that there was a “business process that caused an error in the notarization” of mortgage documents, some in the foreclosure proceedings in “various jurisdictions around the country,” according to a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

While the company said it fixed the problem, the annual report stated it spurred an inquiry by the Clerk of Superior Court in Fulton County, Ga., and most recently, LPS was notified by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida, based in Tampa, that it is also investigating the “business processes” of DOCX.

cconte@bizjournals.com | 265-2227
Read more: Florida AG investigating LPS subsidiary – Jacksonville Business Journal:

RELATED STORY: MISSION: VOID LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES “ASSIGNMENTS”

Freddie and Fannie ran up the “Hill” each with a book and a story…

They helped give away TRILLIONS!

 

Something old … something new … a bit of a rehash here but also some good review. Note page 24. PROCESS THE FORECLOSURE IN YOUR INSTITUTIONS NAME!

They are instructing these servicers to commit fraud!

 And Fannie Mae is doing it too. According to this, they instruct the servicers to just do bogus assignments depending on what they can get away with. None of the parties own the loans, not even Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae!

WAIT FOR THE NEXT WAVE…FHA SUBPRIME DEFAULTS!