INSIDE EDITION INVESTIGATES A STOLEN HOME

HELLO?? Isn’t this EXACTLY what is happening with these Illegal Foreclosures??

5/10/2010

Imagine leaving your home for a while and coming back to find the locks have been changed, all your stuff is gone and there is a stranger in your house, living there. That’s just what happened to one couple. Matt Meagher has INSIDE EDITION’s investigation.

When Tom Decker and his wife Maria tried to open the door of their weekend home in Northern California, they were horrified to find the locks had been changed, and most surprising of all, a total stranger living inside.

“I was in shock. I was in total shock, ” said Maria MacArther.

It was as if they had stepped into a nightmare. Their home, which they owned for three years, was apparently no longer theirs.

So who was the stranger in their house? It was Daniel Judd.

Tom Decker told INSIDE EDITION, “He said, ‘I live here, what are you doing here?’ and we said ‘we own this house.’ He said, ‘I bought this house, this is my house.’ ”

The first thing Tom and Maria did was call the sheriffs office. But when a deputy arrived, Judd produced a deed with his name on it.

Believe it or not, it was Tom and Maria who were ordered to leave.

Santa Cruz Assistant District Attorney Kelly Walker said, “The people come back from vacation and find someone living in their house, can you imagine what you would feel like if that happened?”

The next day, when Judd left the house, the Deckers broke back into their own home. What they found was disturbing. Their clothing, furniture and appliances packed away in the garage.

They also said they discovered anti-government literature, guns and hundreds of rounds of ammunition.

Tom pointed out some of the bullets and said, “These are 45 caliber bullets and you can see that they are hollow point.”

Meagher asked Judd, “Did you steal this person’s home?”

“Absolutely not,” said Judd.

On the surface, Judd seemed to have a case for ownership. He had a deed, with his name on it, which had been filed in the county recorder’s office. He said he paid $14,000 for the Deckers’ home. Yet the house, tucked inside the woods, is worth $500,000.

So who had Judd bought it from? It sure wasn’t the Deckers. It was from 38-year-old Ray Tate, a real estate speculator. Turns out Tate and Judd had been acquaintances and concocted a scheme to grab the Decker’s home out from under them.

So how could someone possibly think they could get away with selling a house that clearly didn’t belong to them?

INSIDE EDITION tried to talk to Tate about the shady deal.

Meagher asked Tate, “How did you think you could take somebody’s home, a home that didn’t belong to you and turn around and sell it?”

He didn’t want to talk, saying, “I have no comment.”

Prosecutor Kelly Walker found that the deed had been forged. Tate and Judd had targeted the Deckers’ home because they thought it had been abandoned. They were busted on conspiracy charges and filing a false deed.

“They’re just manipulating legal documents to try to gain something that they don’t own. It’s stealing something, plain and simple,” said Walker.

The Deckers are now back in possession of their home. But they are still trying to sort out the mess the con-men caused.

Tom said, “The property is still not in our name, it is still owned by Mr. Judd, at least on paper. Everyone knows it’s a fraudelent transaction.”

Daniel Judd, the man who was living in the house, pled guilty and could face a year in jail. Ray Tate, the man who fraudulently sold the house, was found guilty, he faces up to four years behind bars.

According to the AARP, the best way to safeguard from losing your home in a scam like this is to check with the recorder’s office from time to time to make sure that the deed’s still in your name and that all signatures look legitamite. And if something does look a little fishy, it’s important to contact the district attorney’s office immediately.

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Goldman: More CDO Litigation And Investigations Likely Coming

Is the most in-fraudential firm finally going down?

Joe Weisenthal | May. 10, 2010, 7:17 AM BuisnessInsider.com

Goldman’s latest 10-Q is out, and as Bloomberg first noted, the firm is expecting more CDO-related litigation and investigations.

Here’s the key line:lloyd blankfein goldman sachs protestor

We anticipate that additional putative shareholder derivative actions and other litigation may be filed, and regulatory and other investigations and actions commenced, against us with respect to offerings of CDOs.

The full passage is below.

———–

 On April 16, 2010, the SEC brought an action (SEC Action) under the U.S. federal securities laws in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against GS&Co. and one of its employees in connection with a CDO offering made in early 2007 (2007 CDO Transaction), alleging that the defendants made materially false and misleading statements to investors and seeking, among other things, unspecified monetary penalties. Notices of investigation subsequently have been received by GS&Co. from FINRA and by GSI from the U.K. Financial Services Authority, and Group Inc. and certain of its affiliates have received requests for information from other regulators regarding CDO offerings, including the 2007 CDO Transaction, and related matters.
 
Since April 22, 2010, a number of putative shareholder derivative actions have been filed in New York Supreme Court, New York County, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Group Inc., the Board and certain officers and employees of Group Inc. and its affiliates in connection with CDO offerings made between 2004 and 2007, including the 2007 CDO Transaction. These derivative complaints generally include allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, corporate waste, abuse of control, mismanagement, unjust enrichment, misappropriation of information and insider trading, and challenge the accuracy and adequacy of Group Inc.’s disclosure. These derivative complaints seek, among other things, declaratory relief, unspecified compensatory damages, restitution and certain corporate governance reforms. In addition, plaintiffs in the Delaware Court of Chancery actions described in the “Compensation-Related Litigation” section above have amended their complaint to assert, among other things, allegations similar to those in the derivative claims referred to above.
 
Since April 23, 2010, the Board has received letters from shareholders demanding that the Board take action to address alleged misconduct by GS&Co., the Board and certain officers and employees of Group Inc. and its affiliates. The demands generally allege misconduct in connection with the 2007 CDO Transaction, the alleged failure by Group Inc. to adequately disclose the SEC investigation that led to the SEC Action, and Group Inc.’s 2009 compensation practices. The demands include a letter from a Group Inc. shareholder, which previously made a demand that the Board investigate and take action in connection with auction products matters, and has now expanded its demand to address the foregoing matters.
 
In addition, beginning April 26, 2010, a number of purported securities law class actions have been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging the adequacy of Group Inc.’s public disclosure of, among other things, the firm’s activities in the CDO market and the SEC investigation that led to the SEC Action. The purported class action complaints, which name as defendants Group Inc. and certain officers and employees of Group Inc. and its affiliates, generally allege violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and seek unspecified damages.
 
We anticipate that additional putative shareholder derivative actions and other litigation may be filed, and regulatory and other investigations and actions commenced, against us with respect to offerings of CDOs.

Securitization – A Primer “FORENSIC LOAN AUDIT”

The Broken Chain

May 10th, 2010 •  ImplodeMeterBlog

Most people have heard the term “securitization” in media reports about the Housing Crisis. Some even know that securitization involved the selling of mortgage loans to Wall Street. But beyond that, most people have no clue as to what Securitization really is.

Securitization is the process whereby loans were sold to Wall Street and then sold to investors as bonds. It is a process that is complicated, and filled with legal issues. This article will attempt to simplify the understanding of this process. It is outside the scope of the writing to describe Securitization in complex detail, the “ins and outs”, and the myriad details involved. It would only serve to confuse the layman, and to create misunderstandings. Those who understand the process, please keep this in mind. I only want this to serve as a basic Primer.

History

Securitization has been involved in mortgage loans for decades. It started in rudimentary form in 1938 with the creation of Fannie Mae, to help with the Housing Crisis in the Depression and to stimulate home purchasing. At that time, government funds were used, and Fannie Mae was kept on the government “balance sheet”.

By 1968, Fannie Mae was becoming a large budgetary item. The Johnson Administration took Fannie Mae and turned it into a “shareholder-owned” company, which removed it from the Federal Budget. Freddie Mac was created at this same time to be competitive with Fannie Mae.

By the 1980’s, Fannie and Freddie had become major players in the mortgage industry. Other entities had taken notice and in 1990, Long Beach Savings introduced the first “privately securitized” deal for $70 million, executed through Greenwich Capital. It was so successful that other lenders took immediate interest.

In 1993, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America and numerous other lenders “commissioned” a study to determine if private securitization could be effectively accomplished and the best methods to pursue for effectiveness. In 1995, the study was completed, which laid out the road map, and at the same time, identified a method for controlling costs associated with recordings and assignments and for identifying ownership of the loans. Thus was born MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. By the end of 1996, MERS was fully up and running, but not in systemic use.

In 1997, Long Beach Savings “split” apart and the key players went off in different directions. Ameriquest/Argent was the direct result of this split. Later, other entities like New Century and Option One were born from the former Long Beach Savings personnel.

By 1998, Private Securitization was beginning to gain popularity, but the collapse of Long Term Capital in Sep 2008 saw the securitization effort delayed, due to a “mini-financing” crisis. However, the repeal of Glass Steagall in 1999 restarted the efforts. (Glass Steagall prevented Commercial Banks and Investment Banks from conducting the same types of business. The repeal allowed commercial banks to also conduct investment banking and vice versa.)

Countrywide, Indymac and other commercial banks began to create investment operations for the purpose of Securitization, while the Wall Street investment banks undertook actions in reverse. This led to the” Securitization Boom” starting in 2000 and peaking in 2005-2006.

In 2000, the “Dot Com Bubble” burst as well. The people who made money from this boom had already taken their money out and had it sitting in banks and mutual fund investments. When 9-11 occurred, the Fed started dropping interest rates, directly affecting these assets. Wall Street came to the “rescue” offering Mortgage Backed Securities with what was promoted to be great “Return on Investments” with little risk This led the way to the current crisis. (There is much more to this part of the story, but for the sake of simplicity, I shall not cover that in this article.)

The Process

The actual process of securitizing a loan involved the following steps. To keep it simple, we shall assume that a Warehouse Line of Credit provided by a Wall Street firm was used to fund the loan.

• The Wall Street entity “pre-sold” the loans. This meant that parties were found who would buy the loans, and usually fronted the money to the Wall Street firm, though often, the firm would use their “own” money.

• Wall Street would then contract lenders to find the loans and fund them through a Warehouse Line of Credit.

• The borrower needed a loan and went to a broker. The broker did the paperwork and took the loan to the lender who approved the loan.

• The lender funded that loan and many others, through the Warehouse Line of Credit. Other lenders with Warehouse Lines would do the same.

• A “Sponsor” was named for the securitization transaction. The Sponsor would “collect” all the necessary loans and “bundle” them together in one large pool of loans. The loans would then be “sold” to the “Depositor”.

• The purpose of the Depositor was to “deposit” the loans into the “Issuing Entity” or “Trust”, after “segmenting” the loans into various “tranches” or slices of loans, which would make up the different parts of the pool. During this period of time, the loan tranches would be “rated” for quality, and ratings such as AAA were assigned each tranche.

• Once the “Issuing Entity” or “Trust” took possession of the loans which were now segmented into the tranches, the loans were ready to “sell” to the different entities that had already spoken for them. The loans were sold as “Certificates” or “Bonds” known as Mortgage Backed Securities. These were then resold to Investors.

• Incredibly, these Certificates and Bonds were often again “broken up” and resold in smaller portions in values. These were known as Credit Default Obligations. Sometimes, these were broken up again and sold in smaller amounts.

The purpose of the Sponsor and the Depositor was to comply with REMIC and other Tax Code provisions. To achieve certain Tax Benefits, there had to be at least “Two True Sales” of each loan to another entity before the Notes were sold as Certificates. The “True Sales” were supposed to be to the Sponsor, and then the Depositor. Arguably, the Sponsor and Depositor corporations were nothing more than “sham” corporations, to assist in “sham” sales.

For a “true sale”, there must be an offer and acceptance, with the transfer of the Deed and Note and consideration. When the Notes are sold, first to the Sponsor, and next to the Depositor, there is no evidence of any actual money changing hands. Nor were the Note and Deed transferred between these parties by recordings or any other method. One could reasonably argue that these were “sham sales”.

(Note: This is a VERY simplified version of the process, but it gives the general idea. Depending upon the originating lender, it could change to some degree. The purpose of such a convoluted process was so that the entities selling the bonds could become a “bankruptcy remote” vehicle, protecting lenders and Wall Street from harm, and also creating a “Tax Favorable” investment entity known as an REIMC. An explanation of this process would be cumbersome at this time.)

MERS

As described, each Securitized Loan has purportedly been transferred two to three times at a minimum. However, no Assignment of Beneficiary was ever recorded when the transfers took place. That was the purpose of MERS.

The Deeds would be kept in the name of MERS as “Nominee for the Beneficiary”. This allowed MERS to “pretend” to be the Beneficiary and avoid the expenses of recording Assignments at each transfer, usually about $30 per recording. MERS “hid” these transactions behind a “steel curtain” that would have made the 70’s Pittsburg Steelers proud. Even today, it is virtually impossible for most people to find out who the “Issuing Entity” is for a Note and loan that was purportedly placed into a Trust.

Prior to MERS, any transfer of a Note and Deed needed to be recorded in the County of the property as a public record. This was to allow notice of true ownership and to establish a “priority of liens”. MERS circumvented this procedure and obscured the ability of anyone to determine the legal owner of a property.

MERS records are confidential and limited to viewing only by “members” of MERS. To further worsen the situation, MERS “restricts” membership to only “approved parties”. A person or firm can only become a member after a lengthy application, and an “interview”. Unless you are a lender, servicer, or other party that MERS will accept, your application will be turned down because MERS does not want you to have access to this information for litigation purposes.

Pooling and Servicing Agreement and Document Delivery

The Pooling and Servicing Agreement and other related documents for securitization cover all aspects of the transaction. It identifies the parties involved, how the loans are obtained, payment distributions, credit enhancements and other issues. For our purposes, we shall just review the issues regarding the delivery of the documents. The following is from a Goldman Sachs Agreement for GSAMP Trust 2007-NC1. This was a group of New Century loans that were securitized through Goldman Sachs.

From the Agreement:

Delivery of Mortgage Loan Documents

In connection with the sale, transfer and assignment of each mortgage loan to the issuing entity, the depositor will cause to be delivered to the custodian, on or before the closing date, the following documents with respect to each mortgage loan, which documents constitute the mortgage file:

(a) the original mortgage note, endorsed without recourse in blank by the last endorsee, including all intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee (except for no more than 1.00% of the mortgage loans for which there is a lost note affidavit and a copy of the mortgage note);

(d) the originals of any intervening mortgage assignment(s), showing a complete chain of assignment from the originator of the related mortgage loan to the last endorsee or, in certain limited circumstances, (i) a copy of the intervening mortgage assignment together with an officer’s certificate of the responsible party (or certified by the title company, escrow agent or closing attorney) stating that of such intervening mortgage assignment has been dispatched for recordation and the original intervening mortgage assignment or a copy of such intervening mortgage assignment certified by the appropriate public recording office will be promptly delivered upon receipt by responsible party, or (ii) a copy of the intervening mortgage assignment certified by the appropriate public recording office to be a true and complete copy of the recorded original;

(e) the original mortgage assignment in recordable form, which, if acceptable for recording in the relevant jurisdiction, may be included in a blanket assignment or assignments, of each mortgage from the last endorsee in blank;

The Problem

If one reviews sections (a), (d) and (e) with care, an important issue stands out. The Agreement calls for a complete “Chain of Assignment” of the Deed, and a complete “Chain of Endorsement” of the Note. Furthermore, section (e) suggests that there might be mortgage assignments that have not been recorded. This is a problem that litigators are beginning to address so as to argue “Legal Standing”.

There is no recorded and perfected Chain of Assignments, nor is there a Chain of Endorsements in any Securitized Loan, no assignment history that goes from the lender, to the Sponsor, to the Depositor, and lastly, to the Trust, as required by the PSA. Any Assignment of the Deed to the Trust will almost always occur after a Notice of Default is filed and the Assignment is made from the lender or MERS to the Trust. This is done to “establish” Beneficiary Rights in the mind of the Trust. It also tries to unite the Note and the Deed for Legal Standing to foreclosure.

Since the Assignment has occurred AFTER the Notice of Default, and the Assignment is from the originating lender or MERS, there is an unperfected Chain of Assignment. Can this make the Notice of Default lawful? Some attorneys in California are arguing that it is not lawful, and the results of such arguments are mixed, dependent upon the Court and the judge’s perspective. Most often, the Court will rule that since the Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statutes are “exhaustive”, the assignment issues are immaterial. Some Bankruptcy Court judges are beginning to consider this a ‘defect” in legal standing and are reacting accordingly.

The Note has been endorsed in blank, usually with only one endorsement on the Note, or an Allonge, and there is no Chain of Endorsement representing the different entities involved. This turns the Note into a “Bearer Note”. Anyone in possession is arguably entitled to payment under Commercial Code. But if the Deed is not perfected, can the Note Holder foreclose without turning to Judicial Foreclosure methods? This will be the next area that Courts in California will have to consider. Likely, it will occur in the Bankruptcy Courts, and then slowly come into the Trial Courts, after appeals are heard.

The Allonge could present another issue. Under different Statutes and case law, an Allonge must be permanently attached to the Note. This usually means that the Allonge is stapled to the Note, or affixed in some other manner. If the Allonge is not permanently affixed, it poses issues regarding Legal Standing and the ability to foreclose as well.

When preparing to argue Allonge and Note endorsement issues, you are not likely to have access to originals of either document. Courts have tended to rule that the originals are not necessary to prove Legal Standing, especially in California. However, a copy of the Note, especially if it shows only one endorsement when there should be two or more endorsements may offer some Legal Standing questions. An Allonge that is not attached could offer the same. This has been shown, at least to the satisfaction of one Bankruptcy Court, by the copies provided showing no evidence of staple marks in the copy.

Summary

Hopefully, this article has served to explain in relatively simply detail the history of Securitization, the process, and how it was instrumental in events leading up to the Mortgage Crisis. It has also tried to present in limited detail some issues regarding Legal Standing so that the non-attorney can begin to understand the legal issues that may be present with regards to Securitization.

There is much more to Securitization than what I have presented. Much is immaterial to the layman attempting to understand the process. Some aspects, as the payment streams to the different buyers of the Certificates and Bonds are so complex that years from now, people will still be trying to make sense of it.

The Underwriters of the Tranches, I have deliberately avoided writing about. It was not necessary to present for an understanding of how the loans were securitized. Underwriting would be more applicable to the understanding of how the Certificates and Bonds were presented to Investors for purchase. These topics would likely not be of use in present homeowner litigation, but will attain importance in Investor lawsuits.

My next writing will pertain to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and other related documents, and will reveal why this document needs to be presented in litigation, beyond just proving legal standing. The PSA will tie the complete loan transaction, from origination to funding to Securitization, into a concise understanding of why these loans were doomed to fail, and the Housing Crisis becoming inevitable.

Households Overreached, Led to Foreclosure Crisis:

See the connection here to the Bankers Association below.

Study also found evidence of reckless, predatory lending

Thursday, May 06, 2010 newswire.uark.edu

FAYETTEVILLE, Ark. – As the president and members of Congress consider possible home-mortgage consumer protection, policymakers and analysts continue to dispute causes of the 2007-2008 foreclosure crisis, which triggered a much deeper and more serious financial crisis and ultimately an economic recession. Did banks prey on unwitting consumers, or did households overreach and borrow more than they could afford? A new study by University of Arkansas economists suggests that households overreached and bought more house than they could afford, a factor that led to the 2007-2008 foreclosure crisis.

A new study by University of Arkansas economists suggests the latter. The researchers found that most households in foreclosure were relatively affluent and highly educated people, with few or no children, living in geographical areas that experienced extremely rapid real-estate appreciation – the housing bubble. Although they found some evidence of predatory lending, the authors concluded that a more accurate explanation of the foreclosure crisis was that consumers overreached and bought more housing than they could afford.

The researchers were careful not to excuse Wall Street banks, however, because reckless lending enabled households to become dangerously leveraged.

“Our evidence does not disprove or excuse reckless subprime lending by the large Wall Street banks,” said Tim Yeager, associate professor in the Sam M. Walton College of Business and lead author of “The Foreclosure Crisis: Did Wall Street Practice Predatory Lending or Did Households Overreach?”

“We argue that there is plenty of blame to go around for the financial crisis. Both banks and consumers overreached. Banks extended too much credit to households, and households purchased more home than they could afford,” Yeager said.

Relying on massive datasets provided by Acxiom, the Gadberry Group and RealtyTrac, private companies that compile information about demographics, real-estate properties and foreclosures, Yeager and four of his colleagues in the department of finance at the Walton College combined data on demographics and foreclosures to create profiles of households in foreclosure during the third quarter of 2008. Considering this information, they also analyzed geographic patterns of mortgage foreclosures.

The researchers used Acxiom’s PersonicX classification system to identify and examine the characteristics of households in default during the third quarter of 2008. The system separated U.S. households into 21 life-stage groups – “Gen X Singles” or “Mixed Boomers,” for example. Each group had specific demographic characteristics – such as age, marital status, number and age of children and household income – that tied them together. Other data helped Yeager and his colleagues understand property characteristics, such as market values and loan-to-value ratios, of homes in foreclosure compared to those not in default status.

Working with this data, the researchers developed two categories of groups based on formulas for “excess foreclosure shares” and “relative default rates.” The first calculation determined, in absolute numbers, which groups accounted for the most foreclosures. The second calculation – relative default rates – showed which groups had the highest likelihood of foreclosure. If predatory lending was occurring, households within this category were most likely to be victims.

Results showed major differences in rankings between the two categories. Groups at the top of the absolute-number list differed dramatically from those at the top of the likelihood category.  

By far, the group with the greatest excess foreclosure percentage was “Cash & Careers,” the most affluent generation (Generation X) of adults born between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Members of this group had high household incomes, high education levels, high home values and none to only a few children. Also, members of this group were classified as aggressive investors, most of who lived in areas – California, Nevada, Arizona and Florida – of rapid real-estate appreciation.

“Cash & Careers” ranked seventh in the list of groups most likely to default. At the top of this list were four groups – “Mixed Singles,” “Gen X Singles,” “Boomer Singles” and “Beginnings” – characterized by low income and low net worth. Again, members of these groups were most likely to be victims of predatory lending. Except for “Boomer Singles,” these groups show up at the bottom of the excess foreclosure list.

“Although we did find evidence that low-income households had a higher statistical likelihood of foreclosure, most households in foreclosure were relatively affluent and well educated,” Yeager said. “Also, these household defaults were strongly clustered in southwestern and southeastern states, which is consistent with the overreaching-consumer explanation of the foreclosure crisis.”

Overall, results showed that most foreclosed households were not “duped” into bad loans, Yeager said. Instead, they were caught up in a housing price bubble in which both consumers and lenders were too aggressive. This finding is critical because strong consumer protection laws alone will not prevent future price bubbles or financial crises.

“The policy implication from our results is that strong consumer protection laws, though necessary to prevent Wall Street banks from offering high-risk loans to the most vulnerable, will not be sufficient to prevent another financial crisis like the one the U.S. economy experienced in 2007 and 2008,” Yeager said. “A return to high price appreciation could again set off dynamics in which borrowers with decent credit overreach and end up in homes they ultimately cannot afford. The only comprehensive solution may be to pop housing bubbles, which is a much more complex task that would require the Federal Reserve to recognize and limit asset price bubbles.”

An online PDF copy of the study is available for download, or a copy of the study can be provided upon request.

Yeager is a former economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. He holds the Arkansas Bankers Association Chair in the Walton College.

The study’s co-authors are Wayne Lee, professor; Kathy Fogel, assistant professor; and doctoral students Liping Ma and Deena Rorie. Lee holds the Alice Walton Chair and the Garrison Chair in Finance.

Contacts:

Tim Yeager, associate professor, economics
Sam M. Walton College of Business
479-575-2992, tyeager@walton.uark.edu

Matt McGowan, science and research communications officer
University Relations
479-575-4246, dmcgowa@uark.edu

Tennessee vs. MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems April 20. 2010, RECORDING FRAUD

From: b.daviesmd6605

COMPLAINT:

COMES the State of Tennessee ex rel. Barrett Bates, on behalf of real parties in interest, the counties of the State of Tennessee, above-named and hereby complains of Defendants as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Barrett Bates seeks recovery pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-103, the False Claims Act, because Defendants made false representations in order to avoid payment in full of all recording fees reflecting the establishment and/or transfer of secured interests in real property in the State. After having recorded false, fraudulent, misleading and untruthful documents with the land records of the counties of this State, Defendants intentionally failed to cure/correct said false, misleading and untruthful documents and further failed to record subsequent assignments, deeds and other documents evidencing accurate changes in ownership interests in real property and, thereby, avoided, decreased and/or diminished their obligation to pay fees or monies to the counties of the State of Tennessee, the above-named real parties in interest.

PARTIES
1. Barrett Bates, relator, is a resident of the State of Nevada and an original source of information and authorized to bring this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-101, et seq., and as the qui tam Plaintiff because Bates has worked in the secondary mortgage market business and, during the course of his work in June 2009, became aware Defendants were concealing and avoiding the payment of recording fees or other monies to the above-named counties in this and other states and brings this action under Tenn. Code Ann. G 4-18-103 against Defendants for violations of these sections.